




Joint Operations

Joint Doctrine Publication 01

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 01

JOINT OPERATIONS

Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP 01) dated March 2004,
is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Tony Hagmann", with a horizontal line underneath.

Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

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PREFACE

Structure

1. JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*' explains the principles that underpin the planning and conduct of campaigns and operations by the UK's Armed Forces. British Defence Doctrine gives the theoretical strategic context for such operations and other publications describe the tactics and procedures; this document provides the link. It is aimed at operational level commanders, their senior staff and our allies.
2. The aim of JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*' is to leave the reader with an understanding of how to think about planning and conducting a campaign successfully. It is divided into two parts:
 - a. **Part 1 – A Strategic Perspective.** Part 1 outlines a strategic overview within which deployed joint operations take place, in terms of both decision-making and the formulation of strategic direction. Chapter 1 acts as a broad backdrop, describing the key drivers and trends of the strategic security environment. Chapter 2 outlines how policy is determined during times of crisis, and the mechanisms for deriving strategy from this political direction.
 - b. **Part 2 – Building and Fighting a Multinational Joint Task Force.** Part 2 concentrates on the theory and practice of deployed joint operations, national and multinational, highlighting the pivotal nature of command. Chapter 3 describes the characteristics of joint operations and the operational level of war. Building on this theory, Chapter 5 focuses on the key issues to be considered when conceiving and applying a campaign in an integrated and multinational operating environment. Chapter 4 deals with the nature of operational level command and acts as the link.

Linkages

3. **Allied Doctrine.** JDP-01 '*Joint Operations*' is coherent with the ideas contained in the capstone Allied Joint Publication (AJP), AJP-01(B) '*Allied Joint Doctrine*' and AJP-3 '*Allied Joint Operations*'.
4. **National Joint Doctrine.** JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*', together with the capstone publications JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*' and JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*', form the core of the UK's approach to deployed joint operations. The other capstone JWPs provide the important supporting detail of key functional areas.
5. **Single-Service Doctrine.** This publication has been developed in close consultation with the single-Services and Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) and is integrated with the top-level environmental doctrine publications.

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 01

JOINT OPERATIONS

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JOINT DOCTRINE/WARFARE PUBLICATIONS

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires a clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Doctrine/Warfare Publications (JDP/JWPs).

Interim Joint Warfare Publications (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened timescale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in a current Joint Service DCI.¹

¹ DCI GEN 91 2003

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

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JDP 01 JOINT OPERATIONS



PART 1 – A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

JDP 01 ‘Joint Operations’ is intended to provide a framework of understanding of the conduct of military operations: it is, above all else, a way of thinking about a problem, not of providing the answer.

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CHAPTER 1 – THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The purpose of Chapter 1 is to provide a broad backdrop to the rest of the book, to explain the key aspects of the evolving strategic security environment and the nature of modern conflict in order to understand better the role of military force in this wider context.

Section I – Strategic Trends

Section II – The Nature of Modern Conflict

Section III – Implications for the Use of Armed Forces

SECTION I – STRATEGIC TRENDS

“Although I am a futurist today, if I don’t change tomorrow, I will be an historian.”

Frank Ogden

The Evolving Strategic Environment

101. Whereas our military doctrine is for today and the next operation, and draws heavily on past experience, it must take into account the changing context in which armed forces are used. It is notoriously difficult to predict the future with any certainty. However comprehensive the research or deep the analysis, the likelihood remains of conflict occurring in an unexpected location or in unforeseen circumstances.

102. There will be a number of factors that directly influence or cause change, as well as discernible patterns in that change; i.e. drivers and trends. There are 4 key strategic drivers of change: global society, political geometry, demand for resources, and the impact of technology. Given these strategic drivers, and from an examination of the military dimension, certain major trends in the defence and security arena can be identified.

The Strategic Drivers of Change

103. **The Global Society.** The process of globalisation has been gathering momentum over the past half a century and this will continue. The intensity and breadth of external influences on all cultures will be even more visible, but Western culture will remain a major influence. This may provoke a backlash in areas of the world where cultures and values collide; action by anti-capitalists and religious extremists are two examples of such reactions. The 24-hour news media will ensure

that the results of globalisation, including global inequality, are visible to most. This could also fuel hostile reaction, particularly among those who perceive themselves to be on the wrong side of the divide.

104. Political Geometry. Notwithstanding the effects of globalisation, nation states will remain key geopolitical players and most will retain armed forces. However, the way in which state sovereignty is exercised will change. There is likely to be greater interdependence between states, and a shift in power from states to transnational networks; these could be anything from the European Union, through Microsoft to Al Qaeda. The UK is likely to become even more open as a society and will be more dependent on broad stability elsewhere in the world, particularly with key trading partners in the European Union, United States and increasingly Asia. This greater interdependence of states will have many positive benefits. Increased interaction is, for example, likely to advance understanding and tolerance in many societies, potentially reducing the backlashes mentioned earlier. Globalisation may also serve to penalise poor governance and discourage interstate conflict. It is possible, however, that failing states will become a more persistent and pervasive threat to global security; non-state actors may use the vacuum caused by their deterioration. Democratic states may have to intervene more frequently to stabilise dangerous situations in ungoverned territory. Action to face such threats and challenges must be co-ordinated and this will give rise to an increasingly important role for multilateral networks and organisations.

105. Demand for Resources. Competition for scarcer resources is likely to continue, and global demand for energy resources, in particular, will increase significantly. Although oil and gas reserves will still be plentiful in the near future, the location of these reserves, and transport routes from them, will be major security factors for developed and developing nations alike. Food and water too will be plentiful in the developed world, but starvation and water scarcity will remain a significant problem for sections of the world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. Poor distribution and poor governance in such areas will serve only to compound this problem. This, in turn, is likely to lead to increased migration and a rise in calls for humanitarian intervention.

106. Impact of Technology. Technology will be a key driver of change that will pose both new threats and new opportunities. The proliferation of technologies such as information and communications, biotechnology and nanotechnology will be led by industry rather than the military and, as a result of globalisation, will be more widespread than hitherto. Consequently, it will be easier for a range of potential adversaries to gain access to such technologies, enabling them to use greater lethal power, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons.

Trends within the Military Dimension

107. **The Future Balance of Military Power.** This will be affected largely by 4 issues:

a. **Defence Spending and Power Projection.** The US is likely to remain dominant in terms of future military spending, although others may increase their relative importance in global terms. A range of countries will extend their power projection capabilities, but those of the US will remain pre-eminent.

(1) US transformation will drive the approach to future operational capability, and is likely to lead to a more dynamic and less linear form of combat. Most allies will be unwilling or unable to match the financial or organisational challenges of transforming their own forces to dovetail with those of the US.

(2) Those allies who wish to maintain a significant influence on US strategy will need to offer front-line capabilities that supplement, complement or exceed US capability. Moreover, they will have to maintain technical and organisational interoperability with the remaining superpower. Those who choose not to will still be regarded as valuable coalition members but with reduced influence. As a result, role specialisation may increase.

b. **Weapons of Mass Effect.** Weapons of mass effect (WME) and their means of delivery will proliferate significantly. It is judged that a limited number of countries will develop a nuclear weapons capability in the absence of external intervention, and that a greater number could potentially acquire biological weapons. Ballistic delivery systems will proliferate and extend in range; non-ballistic systems, including cruise missiles and asymmetric delivery mechanisms,¹ will become more prevalent especially if US ballistic defence becomes a reality. Non-state actors are likely to acquire WME and will be much harder to deter than state proliferators, making this a key security threat. Delayed lethality and non-lethal weapons such as electromagnetic pulse weapons, radiological and carcinogenic chemical weapons are likely to offer new mass effect threats. When considering this issue, it is of fundamental importance to view the weapons as part of a wider system, and to think of WME in terms of both will and capability.

c. **Posture and Alliances.** US posture will determine global military strategy for the foreseeable future. Its current movement towards enhanced homeland defence, combined with assertive and pre-emptive military action

¹ For example, civilian aircraft, ships, or sleeper devices.

abroad against terrorists and proliferating states, is likely to continue. As long as European allies continue to depend on NATO to guard against any strategic threat to Europe, a conventional threat is unlikely to arise. Alliance nuclear deterrence, and potentially missile defence, will be key in preventing coercion by states armed with WME. Most European allies will concentrate military deployments abroad on stabilisation activities, particularly when poorly governed space threatens Europe directly through international terrorism, or indirectly through softer security threats such as refugees or organised crime. Such activities will normally be in coalition, will typically be reactive rather than pre-emptive, and may occur over wider geographic areas than Europe and its periphery.

d. **Opponents.** A wide range of potential state and non-state adversaries exist, for example: authoritarian regimes, extreme political factions, revolutionaries, religious terrorists and insurgents and WME weapons proliferators. Faced with the conventional military advantage of the US and its allies, states and non-state actors will be forced to use asymmetries in will, endurance, morality and agility to circumvent and deny use of that advantage.² This will manifest itself in the targeting of civilians and vital interests in state homelands in order to coerce or destroy their state opponents. They will avoid defeat rather than seek 'victory', and action will not be through large-scale engagement with military forces.

108. **Categories of Armed Conflict.** Armed conflict will continue to fall into 3 broad categories: interstate, intrastate and conflict with non-state actors.

a. **Interstate Conflict.** The ability to engage in armed conflict will remain the ultimate instrument of state power for the foreseeable future. However, 3 factors dictate that the occurrence of interstate conflict is likely to reduce. Firstly, there is unlikely to be renewed bipolar competition or the surrogate wars generated between the superpowers in the Cold War. Secondly, US superiority is likely to discourage conventional strategic attacks on it, its allies, or those areas where it has strategic interests. Thirdly, the risks for protagonists are increasing due to the cost and lethality of weapon systems, the knock-on effect to regional and global stability, and the strengthening international presumption against war and the associated penalties to those conducting it. However, wars will still occur and will be potentially more dangerous when they do due to the increasing lethality and mass effect of weapon systems and the widening impact of conflict as globalisation spreads interdependencies.

² Asymmetry should not be viewed as '*warfare of the weak*'. The dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima during WW2 is an example of asymmetry used to gain strategic leverage.

b. **Intrastate Conflict.** Intrastate conflict, on the other hand, will probably become more frequent, as globalisation increases cultural conflict, penalises ineffective governance and increases the ease with which groups can operate. Use of proxy forces is likely to become a common factor in elective wars of choice, although these forces can prove difficult to handle in reconstruction activities, particularly when reforming indigenous armed services and police forces (i.e. Security Sector Reform).

c. **Non-State Actors.** There will be more conflict between state militaries and a range of non-state actors, particularly terrorists, as the will and capability of such actors to seek strategic effect and to act internationally increases. State militaries are likely to have an increased role in engaging terrorism, both domestically, within their own overseas territories and abroad, seeking to disrupt and destroy terrorist organisations and prevent state assistance to them. This will require an increase in inter-state cooperation to ensure a coherent multinational strategy against non-state actors who operate globally or regionally. State militaries will also tackle a range of other non-state actors, in particular those involved in organised crime, as this grows in sophistication, scope and scale and adopts para-military style techniques and capabilities.

SECTION II – THE NATURE OF MODERN CONFLICT

“The object in war is a better state of peace - even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”

Liddell Hart

War and Peace

109. Much has been written on the definitions of, and relationship between, war and peace. The term war is widely and often imprecisely used, and has itself become an unhelpful expression. JWP 0-01 ‘*British Defence Doctrine*’ (BDD) notes that ‘*Neither peace nor war exists in extreme form. Perfect peace is the stuff of utopian dreams; absolute war the unlimited thermonuclear construct of one’s worst nightmares.*’³ Instead it places these extreme forms at either end of a wide variety of continually evolving conditions which exist between states. The term war also has a complex legal aspect to it with International Law regulating the circumstances in which states may resort to the use of armed force (traditionally termed *jus ad bellum*) and the way in which armed force is actually used (*jus in bello*, or as more frequently known, the law of armed conflict).

³ BDD (2nd Edition), Page 6-1.

110. Traditional definitions of war have focused on armed conflict between states, frequently involving one or both parties fighting for national survival. This reflects the ‘absolute war’ described in BDD, a condition calling for the mobilisation of all national resources. Despite a general acceptance that there is a decreasing likelihood of wars of this sort, especially involving democratic countries, the UK’s Armed Forces must be able to respond to such a situation given due warning.

111. War is a social as well as a military phenomenon and therefore the use of force and the various constraints upon it will be rooted in wider issues than simply military capability or the lack of it. Social groups compete over resources, identity, religion, or emotional release; states fight over material interests or values. In general terms, wars end in annihilation, by mutual exhaustion, compromise, defeat, capitulation, or simply pause before the next stage.

112. Warfare, the application of lethal force using a range of combat techniques and military capabilities, is the domain of nations’ armed forces. The UK adds non-combat techniques to this equation, recognising that a combination of combat and non-combat can have a greater effect than simply the blunt use of kinetic energy.

Confrontation and Conflict

*“As the weather may manifest many degrees of fairness and foulness,
so the relations of any pair of states may be cordial, friendly, correct,
strained, ruptured, hostile, or any shade between.”*

Quincy Wright

113. Distinct compartmentalisation and categorisation is difficult and unhelpful - overly exact labelling does not aid understanding of such a complex issue. Given the examination of the strategic environment contained in Section I, and within BDD’s spectrum of tension, it might be more helpful from a military perspective to view the global security environment as one of an intricate and dynamic combination of confrontation and conflict.

114. Confrontation implies a face-off, existing within a state of hostility or defiance, caused by politics, ideology or economics, or a combination thereof. It can exist at all levels – strategic, operational and tactical – and in extremis may involve military forces in a deterrence or support role (such as in the Cold War or in Northern Ireland). Although the threat of force is present, the goal is to resolve the cause of the disagreement without resorting to armed action, i.e. conflict prevention. On the other hand, conflict is a fight or struggle where the parties involved attempt to impose their will on each other and invariably entails a degree of armed action. It involves the ultimate application of the military instrument of power to pursue political aims. In more extreme forms the parties to a conflict could be said to be ‘at war’.

Strategic Effects

115. As an island state with limited natural resources, the UK's interests are threatened by global problems. The UK will therefore seek to have a global effect by its involvement rather than simply the protection of individual interests. The Defence Strategic Guidance identified 8 strategic effects which have been developed to add clarity to the Military Tasks and provide additional guidance for the Ministry of Defence (MOD), thereby enabling the MOD to move to an effects based approach to the Departmental strategic planning process. There is a multitude of other effects that Defence can contribute towards and the 8 strategic effects outlined in Table 1.1 are not intended to be exclusive.

STRATEGIC EFFECT	EXPLANATION
PREVENT	To stop or limit the emergence and development of crises and conflict through fostering regional and national security by helping to: address the underlying causes of instability, such as poor governance, political repression, social inequality and economic hardship; implement agreements to reduce weapons proliferation, particularly WME; encourage and assist with Security Sector Reform; build local capacity to deal with emerging crises; encourage the international community to act against emerging crises.
STABILISE	To set the secure and stable conditions required for political and economic action so as to bring a situation under control and return to a state of equilibrium and normality. By and large this cannot be achieved without adopting a wholly inter-agency approach, tackling the underlying causes as well as the symptoms of the instability so as to meet political, legal and basic humanitarian needs. Military involvement might be needed to apply force to assist with the return of political control as well as helping with reassurance, reconstruction, and providing aid.
CONTAIN	To limit or restrain the spread, duration or influence of an adversary or crisis. This will often enable the application of other military and non-military effects in achieving an overall resolution of the problem. Military involvement might be either directly against an adversary or as a third party to a conflict.
DETER	To dissuade an adversary from a course of action that he would otherwise embark upon by diminishing his expected gains and/or raising his expected costs. Military involvement primarily revolves around convincing the opponent that entry into armed conflict will add significantly to the costs of his action and would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the demonstration and communication of a credible military capability and strategy, with the clear political will to use it, so as to back up the use of other political and economic levers.
COERCE	The distinction between deterrence and coercion is a fine one and they share many of the same characteristics. The key difference is that coercion aims to use force, or the threat of force to persuade an opponent to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour, against his wishes, rather than deterrence which is about dissuasion. Both effects might well be used in concert. Coercion relies on the effective communication of the desired course of action, backed up by the threat of credible military force, which will be applied to punish the opponent if he does not follow it. It is also likely to be used in conjunction with political and economic instruments, and the ability to escalate punitive measures will often be required.

DISRUPT	To disable an adversary's capability, military activity can be undertaken to prevent him from functioning effectively by denying him his freedom of action. This can be through directly targeted action against his own offensive forces or via a more indirect approach by isolating him both physically and psychologically from his support and dislocating and disorientating him.
DEFEAT	To reduce the effectiveness of an adversary so that he is no longer able to conduct combat operations. It should consequently bring about the cessation of hostilities and thus facilitate the delivery of our political objectives.
DESTROY	To so damage an enemy state or non-state adversary that he is no longer militarily viable. This effect therefore goes beyond disruption or defeat, by ensuring that there remains no real immediate potential for the adversary to return to conflict. It might include: the removal of an adversary's military capability; the elimination of terrorist organisations.

Table 1.1 - Strategic Effects

Strike and Stabilise

116. The nature of future operations will, among other factors, depend upon the military strategic effect being sought and will invariably require a combination of techniques to achieve the designated political objectives. In broad terms, the application of military force in this evolving strategic environment to achieve the desired effect will require concurrent and balanced strike and stabilisation operations.

117. Strike operations will seek high tempo destruction of an opponent's means in order to defeat his will and capability to continue. They are also about doing so with such speed and precision as to destabilise an adversary and cause him to give up, even when much of his force remains intact. Although technology plays an important role, to conduct such operations requires agility, the ability to reconfigure forces and equipment rapidly to deliver critical effect at the right moment from a wide-variety of platforms. Stabilisation operations will seek to prevent further instability and to provide security for local security forces, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or civilian contractors. They will be as complex as strike operations, but in a different way, and will require close co-operation with organisations outside the normal military domain. Again, agility will be an important factor.

Defence Strategic Guidance – Contingent Operations Overseas

118. The 7 Military Tasks (MTs) outlined in Table 1.2 define the range of contingent commitments that may demand contribution from the UK Armed Forces overseas. They range from humanitarian assistance and evacuation operations, to discrete intervention to the most demanding military operation, Deliberate Intervention.

Number	Military Task ⁴
MT 4.1	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.
MT 4.2	Evacuation of British Citizens Overseas.
MT 4.3	Peacekeeping.
MT 4.4	Peace Enforcement.
MT 4.5	Power Projection.
MT 4.6	Focused Intervention.
MT 4.7	Deliberate Intervention.

Table 1.2 - Military Tasks

119. **A Strategic Overview.** Figure 1.3 draws together the preceding paragraphs in Section II, summarising the UK's approach to the use of Armed Forces overseas.




Figure 1.3 - A Strategic Overview

⁴ See the DSG for a full explanation of each MT.

SECTION III – IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF ARMED FORCES

The Future Battlespace

120. Sections I and II describes a complex and multifaceted environment from which 4 headline issues can be distinguished:

- a. **An Integrated Approach.** It is clear that there are better ways for nations to enrich their own economy than by conquest. Although a credible and usable military capability remains a strong political card, diplomatic and economic power is a more powerful influence on the international system. Solutions to threats to international security will not be exclusively, or even primarily, military and this underscores the need for a properly integrated political/military response at all levels. Success will be achieved through a close partnership of both civil and military actors, fusing the instruments of national power, each with their own unique characteristics, with a wide range of techniques to achieve an enduring resolution.
- b. **Entry and Exit.** The term '*wars of choice*' is in increasing use in relation to armed conflict. While these may initially appear attractive, there are many potential traps. They are often difficult to anticipate, may require ad hoc responses and are subject to political changes of direction. Possibly popular when short, decisive and cheap, a clean and tidy exit strategy is, however, unusually difficult to discern; the conflict can therefore often widen commitments and expose capability gaps.
- c. **The Need for Agility.** This environment contains situations that are increasingly without template; pre-packaged military responses will not be valid. Instead, there will be an increased need for structural and intellectual agility at all levels, including robust and flexible processes and procedures capable of withstanding shock. Innovation, the ability to think imaginatively, plus an understanding of the deeper causes of the conflict, will be critical for success.
- d. **Operational Profile.** Taking into account emerging technologies and the changing international environment, operations are characterised by:
 - (1) Coalition operations with a greater civil dimension.
 - (2) An operational battlespace containing a wide range of combatants – both military and other agencies – as well as a greater number of non-

combatants.⁵ The importance of the population - home, indigenous and elsewhere - and the need to win them over.

(3) The desire to fight from a distance balanced against the requirement to conduct aggressive close combat operations, especially in complex terrain or an urban environment.

(4) Weapons systems with increased accuracy and lethality designed to decrease collateral damage and avoid protracted operations, balanced against public reluctance towards casualties, both friendly and enemy.

Strategic Certainties

121. There are strategic certainties relating to the use of the Armed Forces that result from the UK's geo-strategic position.

- a. All operations will be expeditionary, other than those for the close defence of the UK and in aid of the Civil Authority.
- b. Gaining and maintaining superiority at sea and in the air are essential prerequisites for success in the theatre of operations.
- c. Operations in the theatre will be dependent on the volume and rate of logistic support from the UK.
- d. A secure base must be established in the theatre, from which to mount operations and receive support.
- e. In these circumstances, to reduce the logistic, maintenance and security burden, deployed forces should be limited to those demanded by the mission and situation. This requires all operations to be joint with an emphasis on intelligence and precision, and demands resource sharing.
- f. The size of the UK's Armed Forces requires, in most circumstances, close co-operation with allies; whether in alliance or coalition, as a dominant, equal or subordinate partner. The UK's contribution to such a multinational operation will be determined by political considerations.

Limitations

122. The limitations placed on armed forces will be greater in a conflict short of a war of national survival. These can be considered in 4 broad categories:

⁵ Increasingly known as Blue (friendly), Red (enemy) and White (e.g. NGOs and other civil actors) Forces.

- a. **Political Objectives.** These will often be shaped by what public and international opinion deems is acceptable and legitimate. In a multinational setting, any national objectives will have to be considered against those of allies and coalition partners. Increasingly, legal constraints will play a major role in determining the desired political goals.
- b. **Available Means.** The means available will play a role in determining achievable political objectives; it is not always a question of whether involvement is desirable, but whether it is feasible. Restrictions may be placed on the type of weapons that can be used, the targets that may be engaged, and the size of force to be used. Any military action must directly lead to the achievement of the stated objectives using an appropriate level of force.
- c. **Geographical Area.** Limitations on the operating areas may be placed on the military so as not to widen the conflict, risk casualties or damage to neutral parties.
- d. **Time.** When armed action is involved the imperative is to resolve the issue as quickly as possible, thereby avoiding escalation or an adverse reaction from the international community. While a quick and decisive operation is always desired, the reality is often different.

The Enduring Aspects of Conflict

123. Whereas such things as technology and globalisation have altered the face of conflict, its enduring nature remains unchanged.

- a. **Friction.** Friction is the force that frustrates action and which makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may be mental – indecision over what to do next. It may be physical – the effects of intense enemy fire. It may be externally imposed – by the action of an adversary or the weather. It may be self induced – by a poor plan or clashes of personality.
- b. **Chaos.** Because it is a human activity, conflict is uncertain and chaotic. Incomplete, inaccurate or contradictory information creates a '*fog of war*', which limits perceptions and causes confusion. An adversary will attempt deliberately to deceive and deny understanding of his intentions and his actions, greatly increasing the state of chaos in the battlespace. The commander must exploit chaos by imposing it on his opponent, yet bringing greater order to his own schemes than his opponent. Understanding the nature of his opponent, how he thinks, and how he might act and react, is a prerequisite of gaining this advantage. Because armed conflict is essentially chaotic, the exact outcome is uncertain in all but the most trivial cases. As a result, chance is likely to play a role.

c. **Danger.** Force – whether applied or threatened – is the likely means by which a commander compels an adversary to do what he wants, although force tends to have a greater effect on a conventional foe. The application of force, or its threat, brings danger and with it fear. To a greater or lesser degree all men and women feel fear, and the commander has an important role to play in helping those whom he commands to have the necessary courage to overcome their fear, and thereby ensure success.

d. **Human Stress.** Combat is a stressful activity. The effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, loneliness and privation adversely affect, to a varying degree, the willpower of all those involved. To defeat an enemy militarily it is necessary to erode the willpower of the enemy commander and the forces under his command, whilst maintaining the willpower and morale of one's own forces.

124. All these factors underscore the importance of the servicemen and women who take part in such operations, and the need for effective selection and high quality training and education, to give them the skills and confidence to be successful.

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CHAPTER 2 – STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to explain, in broad detail, the formulation and evolution of Government policy in times of crisis and the subsequent military strategy that flows from it, so that the Commander has a better understanding of how his direction is compiled and updated, and a clearer grasp of how his actions might impact on this higher-level machinery.

Section I – The Political/Military Interface

Section II – The UK Approach to Crisis Management

SECTION I – THE POLITICAL/MILITARY INTERFACE

“You cannot run the details of an operation by politicians around the Cabinet table. You can set straight criteria, strict parameters, strict rules of engagement. Then, the precise way in which those are carried out is up to the military.”

Margaret Thatcher

The Levels of War

201. **The Strategic Level.**¹ The strategic level concerns the application of the full gamut of national resources to achieve policy objectives and is the domain of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The military should not be considered as a separate level, but as one component of the national resources at the behest of the Government. Although the changing nature of politics, economics and technology have added to the complexity of the strategic level, military strategists face the same challenges as their forbears; developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering and re-deploying military forces for the attainment of political objectives.

202. **The Operational Level.** The agreed definition of the operational level is ‘*the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations*’.² In short, the operational level is about employment and provides the vital link, or ‘gearing’, between strategic objectives and the tactical *employment* of forces. Chapter 3 describes the operational level in more detail.

203. **The Tactical Level.** It is at the tactical level that battles and engagements are planned and executed in order to achieve operational level objectives. It is at this level

¹ The term ‘Grand Strategic’, carries with it shades of Empire and has been removed from general usage, as has the term ‘Military Strategic Level’.

² JWP 0-01.1 ‘United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’.

that military forces are deployed directly for combat by the individual Component Commanders, within the overall campaign.

204. **The Relevance of the Levels of War.** There has been much debate over the continuing relevance of the levels of war, suggesting that developments such as improved global communication have forced a compression of the levels of war to the point where such distinctions are no longer valid. This is to misunderstand their purpose. As with all theoretical tools designed to help understand the complex nature of war, they should be applied with judgement. They were never designed as a rigid hierarchy, nor intended to be slavishly applied to an environment that continually evolves and fluctuates. Their value remains in providing a general framework for the planning and execution of operations, and as a useful tool for organising and considering political/military activity. The key difference between military commanders at the strategic and operational levels is that the military strategic authority is concerned with *allocating* objectives and resources and setting necessary limitations, with the operational level commander *ordering* the activities of his assigned forces in pursuit of his own campaign plan.

National Strategy

205. It is worth spending some time examining further the strategic level and the role of military strategy, as a precursor for the rest of this chapter which focuses on the political/military interface, and to place the more detailed examination of the operational level in Chapter 3 in a better context. But it would be wrong to view strategy as either always long-term, or simply an '*intellectual and practical reconciliation of military means and political ends.*'³ A successful national strategy sets out a path, using all 3 instruments of national power - diplomatic, economic, and military⁴ - and other levers to maintain political independence, achieve the long-term aims of the nation and/or protect its vital interests. To be successful any strategy must be integrated from the outset; it will encompass a number of components but not separate and distinct strategies.

206. The 4 traditional tools of national strategy⁵ – national wealth, public (and increasingly international) opinion, allies and armed forces – remain relevant. However, within an evolving international environment in which the likelihood of global inter-state wars is reduced and the impact of non-state global actors has increased, their interrelationship and their application has changed. For example, coalitions are increasingly of the 'capable', rather than simply 'willing', resulting in

³ Daniel Moran, '*The Oxford Companion to Military History*' (Oxford University Press), Page 879.

⁴ Recognising the increasing importance of Information, the US has added it to the 3 traditional instruments, resulting in 'DIME'. The UK approach is to see Information as an essential underpinning of the economic, diplomatic and military instruments in achieving political objectives, not as a separate and discrete instrument. See BDD (2nd Edition), pp. 2-4 & 2-5.

⁵ As described by Sir Michael Howard in '*Defence Studies*', Vol.1, No.1 (Spring 2001), pp.1-10.

large numbers of political participants but small military numbers in total, a greatly increased civil interface and political constraints that are often both acute and public. That said, coalitions of the ‘willing’ will still be important in situations where participation is more important than military capability.

207. Today, no single document exists which sets out the UK’s ‘national strategy’, describing how the assets of the Nation are to be co-ordinated and focused onto achieving policy goals. Figure 2.1 is a way of depicting the relationship between long-term policy objectives and national instruments of state power (diplomatic, military, economic) and other levers, in an effort to ensure the efficient use of resources to achieve the greatest possible effect; what has become known as ‘joined-up government’. Although there are mechanisms in place to achieve close co-ordination, a truly integrated approach, as envisaged in the Effects Based Approach work, is still some way off. Annex 2A shows how an integrated strategy to an individual crisis might be viewed.




Figure 2.1 - A Diagrammatic Representation of the Development of Strategy

The Military Component of Strategy

208. **A Definition of Military Strategy.** As the military component of strategy, military strategy is the process by which military objectives and force levels, which will assist in the achievement of political objectives, are decided. Alanbrooke described it thus: “*The art of strategy is to determine the aim, which is or should be inherently political; to derive from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved; to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and*

the preconditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate; to measure available and potential resources against the requirements; and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.” Any document setting out a military strategy must contain an explanation of how the military strategy is to be integrated with other non-military elements of the national strategy, and how the achievement of military strategic objectives relates to the achievement of the strategic end-state.

209. **The Relationship between Political and Military Objectives.** Alanbrooke’s definition encapsulates all the key components of a coherent strategy. In it he contends that the aim “*is or should be inherently political*”, a key statement which points to the dynamic relationship between politics and military action. However, as Liddell Hart commented: “*The military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily ... impossible.*”, implying that there will be times when military considerations will shape policy. The nature of the political objectives will in turn shape the nature of the conflict. The greater the endeavour – where there is much at stake and a clear legitimacy for armed action is present – the more the conflict will appear military in nature, and political and military objectives will be inclined to correspond. Conversely, divergence between political and military objectives is more likely when the political risk is low.

210. **The Role of Military Force.** The role of military force in achieving the strategic objective must be very carefully considered and be understood by those directing the strategy, and by the operational level commander. If the successful use of force leads directly to the strategic objective then it can be said to be decisive (the operation to liberate the Falklands in 1982 being an example). If the military objective serves to provide a condition in which the strategic objective can be achieved, then military force is not decisive and the use of force is sub-strategic (as in Sierra Leone in 2001). In the case of sub-strategic uses of force, it is important to include those measures – such as political, civil, and economic – that are to take advantage of the military success in the plan from the outset, otherwise the strategic initiative is lost and the theatre stagnates at best. In any event it must be understood that a condition is not in itself decisive and military measures will be required to maintain the condition until the strategic goal has been achieved by other means.

211. **Ends, Ways and Means.** A winning military strategy hinges on the successful union of Ends (objectives), Ways (strategic guidance) and Means (resources). Having decided on the strategic Ends and the role of military force in achieving it, the Means are allocated and the Way they are to be used decided.

- a. **Ends.** The identification of a clear and unambiguous objective is the core issue. However, at the strategic level, identifying a fixed and enduring objective is not always possible. In a conflict that does not threaten national survival, or

in one involving allies, political objectives are less likely to be hard and fast; initial planning may have to be conducted against broad guidance, or in extremis, no guidance at all. There is also a difference between end-states and exit strategies; they are not the same either in nature or timescale. Politicians will want an exit strategy (connected to political risk), while the military looks for end-states. In multinational operations the problems are more acute: certainly an end-state will be more difficult to define. In some cases, nations may enter after the conflict has started and once certain conditions have been met, or leave a conflict before the coalition goal has been achieved.

b. **Ways.** Given the objective and the forces available, a plan is developed to make best use of the available Means. Planning should take into account the likelihood of changes to either Ends or Means, and contingencies prepared.

c. **Means.** The Means at a commander's disposal will be those forces or capabilities allocated to him, although additional forces will be requested by a commander if he feels they are necessary.

d. **The Challenge.** Strategic planners must bring the Ends, Means and Way into balance: to demand a Way to the Ends without willing the Means, or to set Ends without accepting the risk to the Means that will occur with the chosen Way is to court failure. This requirement is difficult to meet when in an alliance or coalition, nevertheless it must be met if the operational commander is to conduct his campaign within a stable context. In situations where the Ends are unclear or there is difficulty in agreeing them within a coalition, consideration of the possible Ways and available Means may help to refine or clarify the Ends. In any event, the crux of any military strategic thinking is to avoid: *“a strategically barren victory - meaning military achievements that however impressive in their own terms nonetheless fail to alter the political context in which they occur.”*⁶

Modern Politics and the Political/Military Interface

“Party politics, party interests still override larger war issues. Petty jealousies colour decisions and influence destinies. Politicians still suffer from that little knowledge of military matters which gives them unwarranted confidence that they are born strategists! As a result they confuse issues, affect decisions, and convert simple problems and plans into confused tangles and hopeless muddles. It is all desperately depressing.”

Field Marshal Alanbrooke

⁶ Daniel Moran, *The Oxford Companion to Military History* (Oxford University Press), Page 879.

212. Despite this rail against politicians,⁷ Alanbrooke understood the critical importance of building and maintaining mutual trust and confidence between political decision-makers and military commanders, especially in times of crisis or war. Both politics and war are about human interaction and Alanbrooke worked tirelessly to ensure that the military provided intelligible and apolitical professional military advice, and insisted on receiving, as far as possible, clear and unambiguous political direction in return. Open and honest communication was the key. Not only did he have national problems to resolve, he also managed to bring together successfully the British position with those of the other major Allies.

213. Political leaders in the last century conducted business with a small staff that was capable of having a firm grasp on the details of the issues at hand. Modern governments require a large body of experts and consultants to support the political figures and decision-makers within them. To know how to take such advice, on what will invariably be complex issues, make effective decisions based on this advice and then convey it to non-specialist leaders, and to the more general population and the international community, is a daunting challenge. The politician today operates in an environment of often intense media interest where situations can change rapidly and must, therefore, be agile, although this agility can sometimes be at the expense of consistency. In trying to keep governments together, maintain a steady course and satisfy the demands of public opinion, while constantly buffeted by many forces, the tensions at the political level are evident.

214. There is a popular misconception that politicians are reluctant to make decisions and favour procrastination to action. This view fails to take into account the complexity of modern politics and the tensions at this level. What is more, experience has shown that if the question or issue is framed correctly, presented within an appropriate timescale, and backed up with the relevant level of supporting information, including an assessment of the risk involved, politicians will make a timely decision. Furthermore, the need of politicians to understand the rationale behind a military operation can result in continual and unwelcome requests for explanation, often viewed by the military as political interference: the '*long screwdriver*'. This can be avoided by clear briefings and the generation of mutual understanding, but requires effort from both sides.⁸ Politicians tend to view everything as a threat or an opportunity and prefer a range of ideas or options to over-staffed solutions. Rather than seek absolute clarity where it may not exist, military planners at this level should be alive to, and ready for, change. In short, the military should focus on giving sound military advice and judgement rather than second-guessing what they think the politicians require. The increasing tendency for lower

⁷ Alanbrooke was clearly exasperated when he made this entry in his war diary, and in later entries qualified his remarks. It was a time of national survival with much at stake and the occasional clash between key decision-makers was inevitable.

⁸ For example, the military need to push several kilometres out from an airport in order to secure it properly may not be immediately apparent to politicians.

staff levels to offer ‘*politically aware military advice*’ or to make judgements about ‘*what the market will bear*’, is unhelpful and counterproductive.

SECTION II – THE UK APPROACH TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The Characteristics of a Crisis

215. A crisis is an unstable period or one of extreme trouble or danger and occurs when stability is lost. No two crises are identical and each needs to be dealt with in the most appropriate manner in order to restore stability. A crisis may be characterised by:

- a. Strategic Surprise – not only in terms of a lack of information but poor interpretation of that information.
- b. High Threat – and to something that is highly valued.
- c. Lack of Time – in which to respond, possibly compounded by lack of pre-planning and preparation.
- d. The Potential for Violence – with the attendant possibility of disastrous consequences.

216. **Crisis Management.** Crisis management is the process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they become armed conflict, while simultaneously planning for this eventuality. Crisis management includes a broad range of events from operations in the UK (such as the provision of Military Aid to Civilian Authorities (MACA)), to deployed operations (such as evacuation, humanitarian/disaster relief or intervention operations), and, ultimately, the transition to war. The aim of the UK’s national crisis management system is to provide a balanced and timely response to any situation that may occur.

The Political Framework

217. **Her Majesty’s Government.** Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) is the body of ministers responsible for the conduct of national affairs. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Queen, and all other ministers are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The composition of governments can vary both in the number of ministers and in the title of some offices. New ministerial offices may be created, others may be abolished, and functions may be transferred from one minister to another.

218. **The Prime Minister and the Cabinet.** The functions of the Cabinet are to initiate and decide on policy, the supreme control of government and the coordination of government departments. The exercise of these functions is vitally affected by the

fact that the Cabinet is a group of party representatives, depending on majority support in the House of Commons. The Cabinet is composed of about 20 ministers, although the number can vary, and can include departmental and non-departmental ministers. The Prime Minister presides over the Cabinet.

219. Political Control and Direction. Control and direction of crisis management is exercised at the highest level by Ministers, either individually or in committee. At the strategic level the Cabinet controls all the various means – diplomatic, economic and military – at the Government’s disposal to resolve crises, of which large-scale military action tends to be the final resort. Crises may be handled by the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet, or by a special Cabinet committee set up to co-ordinate the work of all the Other Government Departments (OGDs) involved. There is no single template for national crisis resolution and ultimately Ministers will decide on the most effective approach to tackling a particular crisis. The leadership and level of departmental input will vary depending on the nature of the crisis. National intelligence assessments, including strategic warning, are co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office.

The Ministry of Defence’s Contribution to Crisis Management

220. The Role of the Ministry of Defence. The MOD is both a Department of State and a military headquarters. In very simple terms, all MOD process, policy and resources are focused on achieving a balance across 3 strands of activity: success in today’s operations, a capacity to respond to tomorrow’s tasks and the construction of capability for the longer term. The relationship between the Secretary of State, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) is of vital importance, and sets the tone for the rest of the MOD.

221. The Key Players. In terms of the formulation and review of defence policy and higher level strategy in relation to the actual or potential commitment of British Forces in crisis, 3 key players are:

- a. **Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments).** The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDC(C)) provides military strategic direction for the potential or actual commitment of UK forces in peacetime, crisis, operations and exercises, supporting CDS’s role as the principal military advisor to the Government.
- b. **The Policy Director.** The Policy Director contributes to the formulation of the Government’s security policy and develops and adapts the defence strategy and policy that best safeguards UK national interests.⁹

⁹ See Annex 2B for a diagrammatic representation of the Policy and Commitments Area.

c. **Chief of Joint Operations.** The Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) is responsible, when directed by CDS, for the planning and execution of joint, potentially joint national and UK-led multinational operations and for exercising Operational Command (OPCOM) of UK forces assigned to multinational operations led by others.

222. **An Outline of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation.**¹⁰ In times of crisis, it is the responsibility of CDS and PUS to ensure that sound and timely advice reaches Ministers. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) acts as the MOD's focus for the provision of defence advice within the Government's overall management and resolution of crises. The DCMO provides the conduit for all briefings up to Ministers and for the dissemination of strategic direction through the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC). It comprises the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee, the Central Staff of the MOD and the PJHQ.

a. **The Chiefs of Staff Committee.** CDS, as the principal military adviser to the Government, will attend meetings of the Cabinet or its sub-committees as required and will draw on the operationally focused advice provided by the single-Service COS and senior civil servants through the forum of the COS Committee. The COS, as the professional heads of their Services, are responsible for the provision of military capability and are thus best placed to advise CDS on the strategic direction of operations and the military advice to be given to Ministers. PUS, as senior advisor on defence policy, attends the meetings, as does a senior official from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to ensure proper coordination between key OGDs. Others in attendance usually include Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the other Deputy Chiefs of the Defence Staffs, the Policy Director, CJO, Chief of Defence Intelligence, Chief of Defence Logistics and representatives from OGDs.

b. **MOD Head Office.** The MOD Head Office part of the DCMO concentrates, in general, on the fundamental policy questions, bilateral relations with Allies and other nations, liaison with international organisations at the Department of State level, and the strategic aspects of UK involvement in an operation. Its focus is to provide clear and unambiguous policy advice and direction and it does not command forces directly nor involve itself in the day-to-day running of operations. It interacts with OGDs, at the strategic level, to synchronise military activity with other non-military strategic activities. MOD Head Office and PJHQ form a close partnership in the political and military aspects of crisis management with the division of responsibility and effort decided by whether the focus lies in the policy or operations area. These responsibilities may shift as the crisis develops.

¹⁰ For a detailed description of the workings of the DCMO see JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning', Chapter 1.

c. **Permanent Joint Headquarters.** PJHQ's primary function is the planning and mounting of joint, potentially joint national and UK-led multinational operations. As an integral part of the DCMO, PJHQ plays a key supporting role in the strategic decision-making process. Close contact is maintained with the supporting single-Service commands to ensure that single-Service views are woven appropriately into overall advice.

223. **The Military Strategic Authority.** The Military Strategic Authority oversees a number of different operations and campaigns, of varying maturity, ensuring resources are balanced appropriately. The Strategic Commander, CDS, advised by the COS, is responsible for the formulation of the military strategy and for its coherence with Government policy.¹¹

a. In doing this, he:

- (1) Appoints the operational commander.
- (2) Designates the theatre of operations and Joint Operations Area.
- (3) Gives strategic direction, seeking to maintain a stable strategic context for the operation, and domestic political support.
- (4) Sets the strategic intelligence requirements.
- (5) Identifies the military conditions for success, and states the limitations (political, financial or legal) on the use of force, with particular regard to alliance or coalition partners.
- (6) Allocates forces and resources and priorities for reserves.
- (7) Establishes a command and control architecture (more complex in multinational operations).
- (8) Dispatches and sustains the force in theatre.
- (9) Recovers the force.


b. **Sustainability - Logistics and Administration.** As noted in Paragraph 121 there are certain Strategic Certainties resulting from the UK's geo-strategic position, most of which carry with them major sustainability issues. The more the UK conducts operations in alliances or coalitions, and is not the dominant partner, the more it is that our senior national commanders have only administrative and logistic matters directly under their hand. The bold use of

¹¹ For NATO operations the North Atlantic Council/Military Committee acts as the Military Strategic Authority. In coalition operations the term Pol/Mil Authority (PMA) is used.

these measures with foresight and economy can lead to a marked enhancement of the effectiveness of the national contingent, and a consequent gain in the national position amongst allies. These administrative and logistic preparations take time to put into effect, and if they are not to delay or restrain the operation they must be considered and initiated at the outset by both the strategic and operational commanders.

Cross-Government Crisis Activity in Practice

224. **Strategic Decision-Making.** The organisations and processes described above provide the top-level framework for the management of crises. However, effective strategic decision-making cannot be done by simply using a process. The nature of the crisis and the interaction of key personalities affect the precise way in which policy and strategy is compiled and updated. There are 4 scenarios in which strategic decisions are made:



“Strategic leadership often takes place in the space where we don’t even know the question, and have to find it out before we can find the answer.”

Figure 2.2 - Strategic Decision-Making Scenarios¹²

225. **Strategic Centre of Gravity – The Key Question.**¹³ According to Clausewitz, *“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking; ...This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”* To do this successfully stems from an accurate assessment of the adversary’s strategic Centre of Gravity (CoG).

- a. The concept of CoG originates from the interpreters of the Napoleonic system. Clausewitz, for example, in explaining what constitutes defeat, suggested that the CoG was *“the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends... the point at which all our energies should be directed”*.

¹² Hugh Courtney, ‘20/20 Foresight’.

¹³ This paragraph draws heavily from an article by Richard Iron and Joe Strange that appeared in Joint Force Quarterly Summer 03 edition.

What is clear from common usage, and indeed from history, is that a CoG is a *strength*. There is, however, an apparent contradiction here in that the manoeuvrist approach advocates a strong focus on avoiding strengths and attacking *weakness*. But even strengths, within themselves, have certain weaknesses that can be exploited, provided they can be accurately identified.

b. Military force is unlikely to defeat the strategic CoG in isolation so an important relationship exists between the strategic CoG and the military CoG at the operational level.¹⁴ The national (or multinational) strategy must harness *all* available assets and activities and focus them on undermining the adversary's resistance; his strategic CoG. At the strategic level the CoG might be something physical but is more likely to be some moral aspect, such as a leader, or popular will, or an alliance; but it *will* be something that *must* be undermined, neutralised or defeated to achieve self-sustaining peace.

c. A moral CoG has 2 central elements: the will to fight and the ability to command the resources to fight. Moral CoGs are identified by analysing people; only people can sustain moral resistance. These 'people' can be arranged into 3 general categories:

(1) **The Leader.** A strong-willed individual who has the resolve to develop a policy of opposition, and then execute and sustain that policy through his armed forces and his people.

(2) **The Ruling Elite.** A closed group, whom between them, direct policy and wield control over the armed forces and the people, and within which the real power resides.

(3) **A Strong-willed Population.** A large grouping of people who share a common ideology or belief, held sufficiently strongly to engage in conflict with an adversary.

d. An analysis of the linkages between these 3 groups leads to the determination of the overall purpose, nature and direction of the campaign. For example; are the leader's value sets different from his people, how remote is he, how do the people influence the leader? For the military analyst at the strategic level it is the role, structures, capabilities and will of the armed forces, and their relationship with these 3 groups, which is the important issue to understand.

226. **Policy and National Strategy.** Irrespective of the circumstances, policy must be identified first. Although HMG owns this policy, it is formed at the political/military strategic interface and as such the MOD plays a key role in shaping

¹⁴ Ideally, there would be only one CoG at the strategic and operational levels. This may prove simplistic when an adversary may have a number of sources of strength, and it is not immediately obvious which is the most critical.

it. Once this has been sufficiently articulated, a national strategy to deliver the political intent then should be derived. This requires a carefully considered approach if a minor partner in a multinational operation. When determining the national strategy, the key questions to be answered by the Government are:





Figure 2.3 – The UK Crisis Management Concept

227. **Cross-Whitehall Co-ordination.** A mechanism is required to allow the political/military interface to function effectively. In previous crises this has taken the form of 3 working groups, described below. It is important to view these groups as an integral part of, not separate from, the Whitehall machinery. They operate in a cyclical, federated way, and should not be seen as hierarchical or sequential. When viewed together, their output is a strategic level, integrated approach to resolving a crisis, based on clear policy guidance. In doing this it would be necessary to *‘think like architects not builders’* and avoid the temptation to over-manage.

- a. **Policy Group.** Essentially this group articulates *‘what the PM wants’*. It comprises senior representation from No10, the FCO, the Intelligence Services, the Cabinet Office and the MOD (3* level), although it can also include others as the situation dictates (e.g. Department for International Development).
- b. **Wider Cross Government Group.** This is chaired by a member of the Policy Group, normally from the Cabinet Office, and its purpose is to keep all departments up to date on the strategic issues.
- c. **Military Strategic Group.** This group is chaired by DCDS(C) and comprises the key military 3*s. Its purpose is to shape the policy, and one of the ways this is done is by circulating the Military Strategic Estimate to other OGDs, which helps them formulate their own plans. The Military Strategic Group shapes the political intent in such a way that it can be written down.

d. **The Process.** The Policy Group derives the UK political end-state, policy objectives and guidance. The Wider Cross Government Group puts a framework around this and provides an excellent forum in which to develop a truly integrated strategy to implement the agreed policy. Although there is no standard document produced by this group, the analysis that takes place at this level could be viewed as the ‘political strategic estimate’. Apart from the influence it brings to bear on the other two groups, the Military Strategic Group then ‘operationalises’ the policy and strategy. All of this is done at the same time as continually referring to and liaising with other governments and international organisations. Early international engagement is of key importance; allies should not be presented with a *fait accompli*.

ANNEX 2A - AN OVERVIEW OF AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY



EXAMPLE LINE OF OPERATION/ACTIVITY END-STATES


- **Rule of Law.** A system of laws and institutions which operates impartially, without regard for ethnicity, religion, sex, race, political affiliation or other natural characteristics, and provides sufficient public order, levels of human and property rights and objective dispute resolution so as to enable the people to enjoy personal freedoms, economic prosperity, representative government and domestic tranquility.
- **Socio/Cultural.** Discrimination should be discouraged and the development of a pluralistic society encouraged(although it is not the role of the international community to determine the form or character of a nations' society and culture).
- **Economic Reconstruction.** Build a foundation for self-managed economic prosperity as part of the global community, with economic opportunities in a market-based economy and privately owned enterprises. Construct a functioning market-driven agricultural system.
- **Governance/Diplomatic.** Facilitate the rebuilding of regional and international diplomatic relations so as to play a positive role in regional and international institutions.
- **Education/Health.** Help, through the provision of technical assistance, in rebuilding the health and education systems to ensure that these services are available to all.
- **Humanitarian Assistance.** Help relieve human suffering by establishing a responsive humanitarian mine and unexploded ordnance action programs.
- **Information.** Support the reconstitution of the indigenous media as a model of free media. Encourage freedom of speech and assembly and the right to dissent.
- **Indigenous Military.** The indigenous military must embrace change, principally a recognition that its role is to support, not dominate, the civil authority; it must become apolitical. Organisational change -restructuring and re-equipping -will be a relatively straightforward process, but it must be underpinned, from the outset, by a significant adjustment in military ethos. Of critical importance is the creation of a professional and representative military leadership that recognises and accepts its role in safeguarding civil society. Minimising the psychological and physical gap between surrender and the beginning of the reformation process is of central importance.

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ANNEX 2B – POLICY AND COMMITMENTS AREA LINKAGES

3-Star Broad Span of Responsibility

Policy Director - Policy/Threats and Capabilities+ Defence Relations
DCDS(C) - UK Home Base and Counter-Terrorism+ Commitments



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JDP 01 JOINT OPERATIONS



PART 2 – BUILDING AND FIGHTING A MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

JDP 01 ‘Joint Operations’ is intended to provide a framework of understanding of the conduct of military operations: it is, above all else, a way of thinking about a problem, not providing the answer.

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CHAPTER 3 – THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to convey an understanding of the theory behind the operational level by examining the characteristics of joint operations and the nature and application of the operational level in a joint and multinational context. It provides a philosophical backdrop to Chapter 5.

Section I – Joint Operations

Section II – The Operational Level

Section III – Campaigning

SECTION I – JOINT OPERATIONS

Introduction

301. Joint operations are described as:

‘...the synergistic effect of tactical activities in a campaign set at the operational level. Joint operations co-ordinate and integrate a range of single-Service capabilities, are multi-agency in character and are normally conducted within an Alliance or coalition framework.’¹

302. Joint operations are more than simply three Services acting in concert; very few modern operations can be carried out by one Service alone. Moreover, although the operational level is almost invariably joint, operations involving more than one Service are not invariably set at the operational level; some joint operations can be tactical, others can be strategic.² The essential point of the description is that a successful joint campaign requires a holistic approach so as to maximise the overall operational effect of the joint force, making best use of the complete range of capabilities. It is not simply about separate and stovepiped operations organised under a single point of command.

Components

303. Components are forces of one or more Service grouped into functional elements (e.g. Maritime, Land, Air, Logistics, Special Forces and Amphibious)³ or,

¹ This flows directly from the Joint, Integrated and Multinational Nature of Operations, one of the Essential Elements of British Doctrine described in JWP 0-01 ‘British Defence Doctrine’ (BDD). The UK view of the term ‘Multinational’ is that it consists of ‘Alliance’ (e.g. NATO) and ‘Coalition’ (i.e. ad hoc alliances). NATO and the US use the term ‘combined’ to describe operations consisting of a combination of nations.

² For example: Close Air Support (CAS), Anti-surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO) and Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) which are all tactical level operations.

³ A Joint Force Amphibious Component may be established if the scale and/or complexity of amphibious operations demands it and/or if amphibious operations lie on the main effort.

exceptionally by Service, organised under component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. The key point here is the term ‘*functional elements*’. Components should be able to dominate a particular environment of the joint battlespace and should be viewed as truly functional elements of a joint force, not as single-Service organisations. The use of components also helps to reduce the span of command, creates flatter organisations and improves internal cooperation; it enables organisational agility.

304. By merging capabilities, weakness in one component can be compensated for by strength in others. For example, a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) may choose temporarily to move ground based air defence assets from the land component to defend forward air bases, releasing aircraft from defence of the bases, and allowing the achievement of a greater sortie rate in support of ground manoeuvre. Denuding land formations of ground based air defence is considered an acceptable risk as the overall effect against the enemy is exponentially enhanced by a greater sortie rate.

305. Components not only fight the tactical battle in support of the JTFC’s campaign plan but also play an important role in informing the joint planning process and in decision-making at the operational level. As well as orchestrating the activities of their components to meet the objectives of the campaign plan according to the JTFC’s intent, component commands should be prepared to assist in planning for the entire campaign.⁴

Joint Operations - A Historical Analysis

306. Military history offers accounts of problems and options and the reasons for success and failure and should not be used selectively to prove a theory or support a particular course of action. Sir Michael Howard recommends that military history should be studied, not to provide universal remedies, but:

“In depth to get beneath the historian’s necessarily imposed pattern of seeming orderliness and to try and understand what war is really like – to get an idea of the confused nature of fighting. In breadth so that the development of war over a long period can be understood. And in context to appreciate the political, social and economic factors that exercise important influences on the military part of the equation.”

307. At Annex 3A is a summary of an analysis of past joint campaigns highlighting certain trends that have been incorporated over time into the UK’s current approach to joint operations.⁵

⁴ Cross component co-ordination is discussed in detail in JWP 3-00 ‘*Joint Operations Execution*’.

⁵ ‘*Joint Operations – A Short History*’ (planned for publication in 2004) explains this work in greater detail.

SECTION II – THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

“Tactics form the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path.”

A A Svechin

Definition

308. The definition of the operational level is *‘the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations’*.⁶ The operational level of war provides the vital link, or ‘gearing’ between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. Without this link, it is unlikely that tactical actions will lead to the achievement of the operational end-state. So not only must appropriate actions be linked by the operational level to the aims of the overall strategy but the strategy must also be linked through the operational level to what is tactically realistic. The operational level is not tactics writ large nor strategy writ small and, as JWP 0-01 *‘British Defence Doctrine’* (BDD) notes, *‘in practice the levels (of war) overlap and the distinctions between them will rarely be tidy’*. Of prime importance is for the operational level commander to understand clearly how his activities mesh with other strategic lines of operation.

Key Characteristics of the Operational Level

309. **Freedom of Action.** The operational level commander is required to conceive, plan and orchestrate all military activities that are needed to seize and maintain the initiative, in pursuit of the military strategic objectives. He should be given a wide range of latitude to do this. However, the degree of freedom at the operational level will depend upon the nature of the conflict, the interaction of military and non-military lines of operation within the overall strategy, and the extent to which national interests are threatened.

310. **Joint and Multinational.** The operational level commander should command all elements of the joint force in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and be able to switch resources swiftly to seek a decisive result. In particular, the vital interplay between both land/air, maritime/air and maritime/land must be recognised and incorporated. Future operations are likely to be multinational and multi-agency and it is at the operational level that, national constraints notwithstanding, unity of effort and purpose toward achieving the strategic objectives must be cultivated and maintained. The political and legal dimension – and its attendant command and control arrangements – will be even more complex in a multinational campaign. A multinational commander must be clear about the terms under which the individual national contingents will

⁶ JWP 0-01.1 *‘United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’*.

operate and the likely political effect that the conduct of his operations may have on the strength and cohesion of the coalition.

311. **Application of Resources.** The principle of Concentration of Force, together with its corollary Economy of Effort, is of particular importance at the operational level. As the commander is unlikely to have a surfeit of resources, the accurate identification of where he can be economical will be vital in order to permit concentration of resources where they will have the greatest effect. Whether alone or with allies the operational commander has a different problem to that of the Strategic Commander. The former is responsible for sustaining the force, essentially a matter of supply along lines of communication. The operational commander has to marshal the forces and resources allocated to him, to fight and sustain the battles and engagements he intends to fight, in order to achieve his object. These forces and resources are men and women of varying skills, the morale of these men and women and their physical condition, and the fighting equipment, combat supplies and materiel with which they fight and exist.

312. **Total Effect.** The operational level is about harmony of ultimate purpose, not unison of military postures to achieve it. To succeed at the operational level the commander should ensure that the power of the whole – the campaign – is greater than the sum of its parts, the major operations, battles and engagements. To do this the operational level commander should be able to visualise the tactical activity that makes up his campaign plan, asking himself:

- a. Will/might the action achieve, or does the action have the possibility of achieving, a decision that materially alters the situation in terms of the overall campaign?
- b. Might the action achieve a decision that materially assists directly in realising strategic goals? Is there a political dimension?
- c. What effect does the action seek to achieve? Effects can be: Intended/Unintended, Desired/Un-desired, Positive/Negative, Expected/Unexpected, Kinetic/Cognitive, Instantaneous/Delayed, Localised/Distributed, Permanent/Temporary or a combination thereof.

313. **Public Support.** Without public support and the endorsement of the international community, the will of the forces involved in operations, as well as the will of national governments to employ those forces, may be seriously undermined. Incorporated into an overall campaign plan, a media policy cultivating a positive image of the Joint Task Force's (JTF) efforts to achieve its strategic objectives should be planned and executed with determination and vigour, while at the same time being sensitive to negative aspects of media activity with respect to the end-state.

The Operational Level Framework

314. **The Manoeuvrist Approach.** The Manoeuvrist Approach is a key tenet of the British way of conducting operations; it is one of the identified six Essential Elements and is explained in detail in BDD. From the Manoeuvrist Approach four key aspects of the operational level can be derived which considered together form a framework for operations: in this sense this framework is to do with both ‘*doing*’ and ‘*visualising*’. They are: SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT, and EXPLOIT. As functions of a manoeuvrist approach they are the groups of activities which are most likely together to lead to success. As a construct they help to visualise how major operations, battles and engagements relate to one another, within the overall campaign. But they must not be viewed as sequential or separate and distinct phases, the key being to maintain a clear focus on success, balancing the need to be bold and decisive with the constraints and limitations of modern operations. Implicit in this approach is the need to understand fully the nature of the problem, a key pre-condition to successful operational design.

315. **SHAPE the Operational Environment.** Erode the will and resolve of adversary military and political decision-makers, in combination with other strategic activities, to ‘*create the picture of defeat in the mind of the adversary*’.⁷ To attack the will of his opponent, the JTFC should create the *perception* in the mind of the adversary - and his political masters - that achieving their end-state is unlikely without significant loss of political credibility and resources. In doing so, the JTFC should weaken the resolve of the adversary commander to continue, thus making the cohesion of his force more vulnerable to attack. Threatening him, or appearing to threaten him, throughout his depth, and never allowing him to feel secure anywhere, can seriously undermine or shatter his will. Simultaneously, and acting within the wider political context, the legitimacy and justification for the use of force should be conveyed in order to build and maintain support for own actions in home and other audiences. The difficulties of doing this should not be underestimated and illustrate the importance of a *true* understanding of the nature of the problem. Of key importance in this are:

- a. **Information Operations.** Information Operations (Info Ops) can focus on wearing down the adversary’s will, for instance by exploiting internal differences (cultural, ethnic, religious and economic), by fostering mistrust or lack of confidence between levels of command, and by degrading the adversary command and control infrastructure. The defensive aspects of Info Ops can promote the cohesion of friendly forces.
- b. **Media Operations.** The JTFC should ensure that he impresses his message on the media and strives to mould the opinion of the neighbouring

⁷ Richard Simkin, ‘*Race to the Swift*’.

countries, the host nation and civilian population to be at least sympathetic to the declared end-state.

316. **ATTACK the Adversary's Cohesion.**⁸ The focus must be (if necessary to wrest and then) to maintain the initiative. Every effort should be made to avoid fighting the adversary on his own terms - his strengths must be made irrelevant. The qualities that promote cohesion are also those which, if attacked, destroy it. By manoeuvring to surprise the adversary, by using firepower selectively to attack that which underpins his cohesion (e.g. critical Command and Control (C2) systems and vital logistic and industrial facilities), harmonising these with attacks on his will to continue the struggle, his cohesion can be broken apart and shattered to the point where he is defeated or neutralised. However, the JTFC should consider the manner in which that defeat is achieved. A resolute adversary may consider it worth resisting in a piecemeal manner, prolonging the struggle in the hope of a failure of will by his opponent. Particular problems will arise when confronting an adversary that has the ability both to fight cohesively – as an armed, organised body – and then to change into a more diffuse, loosely structured organisation. When facing such a force, defeating the adversary's will may well be more important than attacking his cohesion. Therefore, it is important to view attacks on the adversary's will and cohesion as complementary activities which require to be addressed simultaneously, not as discrete or sequential issues. Cohesion is attacked through:

a. **Synchronisation of Firepower and Manoeuvre.** Although they can achieve a significant effect on their own, the synchronised use of firepower and manoeuvre has devastating potential. Firepower destroys, neutralises, suppresses and demoralises. It is delivered by a range of platforms and can achieve both lethal and non-lethal effects. Firepower provides the violent, destructive force that amplifies the effects of other means of attacking cohesion. Firepower effects are the sum of volume, accuracy, lethality, suddenness and unpredictability, and these are magnified by synchronising joint firepower⁹ in time and space. The effects of firepower must be exploited by manoeuvre if the results are to be more than transitory. Operational manoeuvre seeks to place the adversary at a disadvantage and may be physical or conceptual in nature. In the physical sense the psychological effect may be so great as to render fighting unnecessary. In the conceptual sense, manoeuvre pressure may be applied in such a way so as to present the adversary with a choice of unattractive options that force him to concede. While historically manoeuvre has been defined as the combination of mobility and firepower, it might be better viewed now as a

⁸ In a situation where there is no clear adversary, this might be the *object* of the mission, i.e. the thing which provides the greatest resistance to the mission, and in this sense is 'Affect' rather than 'Attack'.

⁹ A joint approach to firepower will ensure the greatest effect. For example, the persistent nature of land based firepower is dependent on a sizeable logistic effort to move ammunition, especially artillery natures, whereas air platforms lack the endurance of ground systems but have greater reach, are more flexible and less reliant on mobile logistics.

combination of mobility and effect. See Annex 3B for an explanation of the forms of joint manoeuvre.

b. **Tempo and Simultaneity.** Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity of operations, *relative* to the adversary. Tempo comprises three elements: speed of decision; speed of execution; and speed of transition from one activity to the next. Greater tempo will overload the adversary's decision-making process at critical levels and is likely to cause paralysis, inaction and a breakdown of resistance to the point where he loses the cohesion needed to continue the fight. This can be achieved by speeding up or slowing down, or changing the type of activity. Simultaneity seeks to overload the adversary commander by attacking or threatening him from so many angles at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time, or even establish priorities between them. He faces menacing dilemmas about how and where to react, he is torn in different directions and even if he is not paralysed, he finds it hard to respond coherently. Simultaneity should be seen through the eyes of the adversary and its use judged by the effect on his cohesion. If the effect of simultaneity and tempo is repeated concurrently against a number of levels of command, a cumulative effect on cohesion is felt throughout the adversary force. By using the full gamut of friendly capabilities, the adversary's problems are compounded, his response to one form of attack either making him vulnerable to another, or exacerbating a different problem.

c. **Surprise.** Surprise is built on speed, security and deception and is fundamental to the shattering of an adversary's cohesion. As with tempo, time is the key factor. It is not essential that the adversary is taken unaware but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. Absolute surprise may totally paralyse the adversary, but partial surprise will also degrade his reaction. Surprise involves identifying, creating and exploiting opportunities, which may be fleeting. It means doing the unexpected or reacting in an unexpected manner, playing on the adversary's perceptions and expectations.

d. **Asymmetric Warfare.** Few aggressors will take on a state of superior military strength according to established rules. Rather they will seek ways to negate advantage and undermine a superior opponent's will, credibility and influence. There are 3 potential areas of asymmetry in warfare: the asymmetric nature of an opponent himself (i.e. he is difficult to identify and target, or even negotiate with), the asymmetric nature of an opponent's ideals or culture (which are at variance to one's own beliefs, priorities and moral constraints) and the asymmetric methods that an opponent may employ to counter a qualitative and quantitative advantage. Exploiting an opponent's weakness is fundamental to success, just as the identification of the weaknesses that an opponent would wish to target is crucial to countering the asymmetric threat (i.e. PROTECT).

317. **PROTECT the Cohesion of the Force.** At the same time as attacking the adversary's cohesion, that which provides the 'glue' for the JTF must be protected. This is applicable to national and multinational operations although multinational operations, particularly those comprising ad hoc coalitions, pose a particular challenge. Contributing nations may have differing agendas and provide forces with varied degrees of fighting power, including different doctrine and incompatible equipment. Personalities and political influence are likely to have a disproportionate affect on the cohesion of a multinational force.

a. **Maintenance of Morale.** Having identified a friendly force's critical vulnerabilities, either by the intelligence process or as a result of physical attack, the adversary will make every effort to attack weaknesses, to reduce morale and thus erode cohesion. In multinational operations, the adversary may try to inflict disproportionate casualties on one particular nation's forces, or exploit religious or cultural differences. The JTFC should attempt to mask these vulnerabilities and focus the force on the maintenance of the aim, whilst ensuring a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to Force Protection, based upon risk management and a measured assessment of the threat.

b. **Unity of Purpose.** The effective employment of military forces requires them to be directed relentlessly towards the achievement of a common aim or mission. The JTFC plays a key role in focusing his command on achieving the mission and generating a common sense of purpose. Within multinational operations, individual goals and interests will need to be harmonised to ensure a common purpose, and consensus will need to be maintained to ensure political and military cohesion.

318. **EXPLOIT the Situation by Direct or Indirect Means.** The JTFC should be prepared to exploit opportunities to achieve a better position relative to the prevailing circumstances or the adversary. This involves: identifying or creating opportunities; having or obtaining the means and will to exploit them; and achieving a higher tempo relative to the adversary.

a. The use of manoeuvre and offensive action is fundamental to seizing and holding the initiative, which is the key to being able to exploit opportunities. Mission Command allows Component Commanders (CCs) or subordinates to exploit opportunities that present themselves, providing they are within the overall intent.

b. The ability to do this successfully relies on continuous planning, including accurate risk analysis and management. Both subjective and objective risk analysis is required and intuition has a role to play here. The JTFC should promote a culture that is aware of risk, rather than one that is averse to risk. This approach requires that commanders at all levels are able to identify those

areas where significant risk lies and then choose to accept, avoid or mitigate against them. The commander that analyses, assesses and actively manages risk is frequently able to seize opportunities and take bold decisions. Key events or effects are identified in each phase of the course of action (CoA) that is judged to be: of significant operational concern; could provide a potential opportunity for exploitation; or of unknown quantity whose outcome could be significant.

SECTION III – CAMPAIGNING

“Thus war becomes an art – an art, of course, which is served by many sciences. In war, as in art, we find no universal forms; in neither can a rule take the place of talent.”

Moltke ‘the Elder’

Introduction

319. Modern joint operations are always complex and usually fast moving. They demand a web of procedures, systems and processes in order to bring some sort of structure to a diverse and dynamic set of circumstances. But in themselves these mechanisms are not enough and high command still requires what Moltke referred to as ‘*talent*’ and TE Lawrence as the ‘*irrational tenth*’.¹⁰ However that raw ‘*talent*’ may never be realised without judicious use of certain taught skill sets. Artists such as Picasso were bold and unconventional, others such as Rembrandt were more traditional and conservative - both were brilliant but neither could have achieved what they did without an understanding of the tools of their trade.

320. This section describes campaigning, a combination of Operational Art, Operational Design and Operational Management, three notions which when considered together form the foundation of a successful campaign. It is an approach that seeks to fuse that ‘spark of brilliance’ with the necessary process and procedures to achieve success; to win. It must not be viewed as a rigid and hard sequence to be applied mechanistically. The important thing to understand is what each element means and how they relate to each other, not what order they come in. See Annex 3C for a schematic depiction of how the three ideas fit together.

Operational Art

321. **Definition.** At the very core of the operational level of war is the concept of Operational Art. Operational Art is a term that has been accredited to Soviet military theorists of the 1920s, although much of their work had German antecedents. It

¹⁰ “Nine tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the flash of the kingfisher across the pool and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct sharpened by thought, practising the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as reflex.”

emerged from the development of the Soviet idea of ‘deep battle’ which saw the co-ordinated use of a range of capabilities, in close harmony with key enabling functions such as intelligence and logistics, in order to avoid tactical deadlock or heavy losses through attrition. The UK defines Operational Art as *‘the orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result’*.

322. Link to the Strategic Level. Operational Art provides the linkage between tactical success and the strategic end-state; it is the skilful execution of the operational level of command. Operational Art is heavily dependent on an understanding of the complete problem, an understanding that has three main facets. The first is a comprehensive insight into the adversary, his values, aims and intentions, and his responses. It also requires the ability to visualise the tactical activities that make up a campaign (which in turn hinges on an understanding of force capabilities), and the effect of tactical actions on both the adversary, and the Alliance or coalition of which the joint force will normally be a part. Last, but reliant on the first two, is an understanding of risk, its effect and how it is minimised and managed. Chapter 2 discussed Ends, Ways and Means, highlighting its importance to a successful strategy. An operational level commander may also use this construct as a way of discussing the problem with the Military Strategic Authority. For instance, an operational level commander may be able to achieve the Ends with the Means allocated but at considerable risk. In discussions with his superiors to reduce these risks, more Means may be allocated, the Ends adjusted to suit the Means, or other Ways examined to achieve the Ends.

- a. **Ends.** What is the objective? If the political objective changes, as it sometimes will, over time or in response to changing events, that new objective will invariably create a requirement for a change in the plan or even a new campaign plan.
- b. **Ways.** How is it to be achieved? How do I make it happen? This is the crux of campaigning.
- c. **Means.** What resources do I have at my disposal? Commanders consider the nature of their force, what objectives are within its grasp, and the nature of the risks inherent in pursuing that objective with the given force.

323. Operational Ideas. Operational Art thus demands creative and innovative thought to find broad solutions to operational problems, solutions that might be termed Operational Ideas. These Operational Ideas are, in effect, the output of Operational Art and are the source of the Commander’s Intent and subsequent Concept of Operations. They represent the basis of the Campaign Plan and are further refined by the process of Operational Design. As such they are the domain of the JTFC and the foundation of a command led staff system. Operational Ideas are best expressed in

terms of the application of the manoeuvrist approach at the operational level: SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT and EXPLOIT. There are three closely inter-linked concepts which are especially useful in the formulation of Operational Ideas: Centre of Gravity (CoG) Analysis, Campaign Fulcrum and the Decisive Act. The key to Operational Art is to identify beforehand what is going to be decisive in bringing about the downfall of the adversary. Identifying that decisive act comes from an analysis of centres of gravity.

324. **Centre of Gravity Analysis.** Paragraph 225 introduced the concept of a CoG and explained its application at the strategic level. At the operational level a CoG will normally be something physical, something real that can be attacked; the key is to find some element of the adversary's military system, upon which his plans must depend. As well as identifying an adversary's CoG, and determining ways of attacking it, the commander should also assess his own CoG in order that he can protect it.

a. **Centre of Gravity Analysis.** The first step is to identify the adversary's key strength from which he derives his '*freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight*'¹¹ his CoG. It should be clear *why* it is a CoG and what it can *do* that makes it a centre of gravity. This is termed Critical Capability. By way of a simple example, it is a CoG because it can *defeat* our defences, or *block* our attack. Once this is clear the next step is to examine what it - the CoG - needs to *achieve* that Critical Capability: in other words Critical Requirements. These Critical Requirements are defined in the same way as objectives, for example, assembling enough merchant shipping to get into theatre, achieving air superiority, or retaining superior combat power. These Critical Requirements are then examined to determine if there are in some way incomplete, or missing, or vulnerable. These become the Critical Vulnerabilities, the things that can be exploited in order to bring down an adversary's CoG. Critical Vulnerabilities can be intrinsic weaknesses, external vulnerabilities that might prevent a CoG from ever getting to the battle, or the vulnerabilities of other forces relied on by the CoG. They may be technical, geographic or cognitive, and often will present only fleeting opportunities for attack.

b. **Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix.** These 4 elements are brought together into a matrix (see Table 3.1) and, although a sequence has been described, it can be approached in a number of ways. The value of this approach is, through a combination of objective and subjective analysis, the underpinning logic as to why a CoG has been chosen is made clear, increasing the chances of correct selection.

¹¹ JWP 0-01.1.

CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS MATRIX	
CENTRE OF GRAVITY <i>(A strength.)</i>	CRITICAL CAPABILITIES <i>(That which makes it a CoG.)</i>
CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS <i>(That which it needs to be effective.)</i>	CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES <i>(Through which it can be attacked or neutralised.)</i>
<i>Adversary CoG - Exploit Critical Vulnerabilities.</i> <i>Own CoG – Achieve Critical Requirements; Protect Critical Vulnerabilities.</i>	

Table 3.1 - Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix

c. **Identifying a Centre of Gravity - a Possible Checklist.** The accurate identification of CoGs is very difficult. This approach seeks to provide commanders and staffs with a useable and useful tool for looking at both adversary and own CoGs that is logical and not counter-intuitive. An operational level CoG will normally be something physical. It is not an ability; for example, it is not the ability to project power into theatre nor the ability to sink ships. These are Critical Capabilities, important parts of the CoG but not the strength itself. In identifying own and adversary CoGs the following considerations may be of use:

- (1) *It is something that hurts.* This means that it is a force, or someone or something that controls a force. It is not a rail network, nor a port, nor an ability to do something. Those may be Critical Requirements or Critical Capabilities.
- (2) *It resists the achievement of an adversary's end-state.* It is a CoG because of what it can *do*. It comes from the adversarial nature of conflict and is only relevant in the context of the conflict. What makes it important is the manner and extent to which it imposes itself on an adversary.
- (3) *Its defeat, destruction or neutralisation will lead to an adversary's defeat.* The connection between attacking an adversary's CoG and the effect it will have on the desired outcome should be clear; if I defeat or eliminate his CoG, will it lead inevitably to the achievement of the End-state?
- (4) *It contributes to the achievement of the strategic CoG.* There should be a clear relationship between strategic and operational CoGs but not in an obvious physical sense. They will be conceptually distinct but the linkages and inter relationships should be examined.

325. **Campaign Fulcrum.** There is a stage in every contested campaign where one side starts losing and the other starts winning, where the tide turns and the initiative switches irreversibly. This will be caused by a number of issues acting in combination and, although difficult to predict in advance with any certainty, the value of attempting to identify this event is in order to be prepared to exploit fully its potential. In a negative sense, it might be the result of, for example; a higher than planned consumption of critical and irreplaceable resources, a series of tactical reverses, a change in political context. Successful commanders achieve the end-state before there is a risk of reaching this state, or plan in order to avoid it. Intelligence, operations and logistic staffs need to liaise closely to identify, then plan to either exploit, delay the onset, or minimise the effects of, campaign fulcrum.

326. **The Decisive Act.** Closely linked to the idea of campaign fulcrum is an associated concept, that of the decisive act or the decisive operation. In Clausewitzian terms this was the idea of a single, decisive battle; “...*how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point*”. Battles and engagements are now viewed as stepping stones towards a higher goal, but it is still important to try to find something, or a series of linked events, that will be decisive within a campaign, that which causes an opponent to forever lose the initiative, and the sequence of actions that, together, will bring this about: in other words *shaping* operations leading to a *decisive* operation.

Operational Design

“...*but in order to think of war scientifically, for until we do so we shall never become true artists of war.*”

JFC Fuller

327. **The Principal Elements of Operational Design.** Operational Design is a process which further develops and refines Operational Ideas. Three things together comprise the principal elements of Operational Design: the Operational Estimate, the Campaign Planning Concepts (CPCs) and the Campaign Plan. The Campaign Plan, which articulates the operational level commander’s overall scheme for operations, results from the Operational Estimate and is largely constructed using a number of theoretical building blocks collectively known as the Campaign Planning Concepts.

328. **The Operational Estimate.** However one might look at it, the Operational Estimate is a military problem solving process which is applied to ill-structured problems in uncertain and dynamic environments against shifting, competing or ill defined goals, often in high stake, time-pressured situations. It combines objective, rational analysis with the power of intuition (a combination of experience and intelligence) and its output is a *decision* about a course of action. Guided and energised by the commander, the Operational Estimate is a mechanism designed to draw together a vast amount of information necessary for the thorough analysis of a

set of circumstances, in order to allow the development of feasible courses of action and the subsequent translation of a selected option into a winning plan. It is, essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action.

- a. The Estimate process is central to the formulation of the Campaign Plan and the subsequent modification of operation orders and directives. Although there are variations in scale or focus, there is nothing fundamentally different about the estimates carried out at different levels, by different components or in various functional areas. The term 'Operational Estimate' is used to describe the process carried out by the operational level commander and his staff. All other estimates, either environmental or functional, at the operational or tactical level, should be designed to contribute to the Operational Estimate.
- b. There are 6 broad steps to the Operational Estimate that commanders and staff can use, according to the situation at hand. Table 3.2 shows each step and its purpose, with a fuller description contained in Annex 5A.¹²

Step	Purpose
Step 1 – Review of the Situation (Geo-strategic Analysis).	To ensure that the whole staff have a common understanding of the background and underlying causes of the problem, and have a firm grip of all parties' political objectives.
Step 2 – Identify and Analyse the Problem (Mission and Object).	To gain a clear understanding of the problem that has been set.
Step 3 – Formulation of Potential CoAs by the Commander.	To focus staff effort on informed factor analysis in order to establish the art of the possible.
Step 4 – Development and Validation of CoAs.	To create detailed and workable CoAs that can be tested for likelihood of success.
Step 5 – CoA Evaluation.	To present sufficient detail to the Comd to allow him to select a winning concept.
Step 6 – Commander's Decision and Development of the Plan.	To turn the winning concept into a workable plan.

Table 3.2 - The Operational Estimate

- c. The 2 central interconnected ideas within this framework are:

¹² The Operational Estimate is described in detail in JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning', Chapter 2.

(1) **Understanding the Complete Problem.** The problem is of prime importance and is composed of 2 parts: the assigned *mission* and the *object* of that mission. The object is the thing on which the mission bears or which provides the greatest resistance to that mission, and will often, but not always, be the adversary's military forces. The result of analysis of mission *and* object, early on in the planning process, is a greater understanding of the problem that has been set and, as a consequence, the ability to identify CoAs for achieving success. Insufficient attention to consideration of the complete problem at an early stage of the process will result in unfocused factor evaluation that is unlikely to produce a winning course of action.

(2) **Establishing the Art of the Possible.** A thorough understanding of the problem establishes a logical and credible basis for a commander to give rational and constructive direction to the staff, without in any way constraining further refinement of the problem, or initiative at lower levels. Thus the staff can then concentrate on establishing what is within the art of the possible using planning factors which are relevant to and further assist in understanding the problem, not some predetermined checklist.

329. **The Campaign Planning Concepts.** The CPCs are used to build the framework within which operations take place, and can be seen as a bridge between Operational Art and Operational Design – more campaigning concepts than simply planning tools. In addition they assist commanders and staffs in both visualising how the campaign might unfold, and in managing the development of operations. In this sense they can be viewed as a paradigm through which to view the solution to a complex problem. They can be used individually, although they are all closely related, and are best used as part of a set; it is for the commander to decide their utility in the prevailing circumstances. In broad terms, the CPCs serve 3 purposes: to focus effort during the Operational Estimate, to help describe in campaign plans and directives what is required to be achieved, and to assist in monitoring the execution of a campaign or major operation. They are listed in Annex 3C.¹³

330. **The Campaign Plan.** A campaign is defined as: '*a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces*'.¹⁴ The Campaign Plan, the practical expression of Operational Art, conveys the operational level commander's vision for how he sees the operation unfolding and is translated into actionable detail by operations orders and directives. It is essential in providing

¹³ See JWP 5-00, Chapter 2 for a fuller explanation of the CPCs.

¹⁴ JWP 0-01.1.

the crucial common understanding across the JTF of the Commander's Intent and his overall Scheme of Manoeuvre.

- a. As a minimum it must clearly set out:
 - (1) The overall effect desired, relative to the adversary.
 - (2) The relationship between key objectives and the end-state.
 - (3) The key objectives, their relative importance, and the sequence in which they are to be achieved in order to unlock the CoG and achieve the operational end-state.
 - (4) How success will be measured. What conditions must be achieved before the operational end-state can be said to be achieved? How does this relate to the strategic goal?
 - (5) The allocation of forces and resources and the necessary command and control arrangements.
- b. **Concept of Operations.** This is the heart of the Campaign Plan and belongs to the JTFC. His mind should be focused on forming the essence of the Campaign Plan, and then communicating it to his subordinates. The ultimate test being that subordinate commanders can act independently as though they were directly ordered by the JTFC. A Concept of Operations has 3 main elements:
 - (1) **Commander's Intent.** The commander's intent should focus on the overall effect the JTF is to have on the adversary. It should be a concise and precise statement of how the JTFC intends to achieve the operational end-state by defeating the adversary's CoG, and must not be a synopsis of the operation. In effect it provides the driving logic behind the whole campaign plan.
 - (2) **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** The scheme of manoeuvre builds on the commander's intent and should be an expression of the JTFC's vision of how the campaign is to develop. Ultimately the scheme of manoeuvre describes how the JTFC sees the components of the force operating within the overall campaign plan and should give foundation to the mission statements. The JTFC should explain where, when and how the JTF will achieve its purpose in relation to the adversary, in order that CCs understand what their particular role is in the overall plan and the effect they are to achieve.

(3) **Main Effort.** Main Effort is the concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, in order to bring about a decision. It is the principal method by which a commander makes his overall intent clear to his subordinates and will usually be supported by the allocation of resources in order to give substance to that which he considers crucial to the success of his mission.¹⁵ By articulating a Main Effort, subordinate commanders are able to take timely and independent action in fast-moving and changeable operations, thereby contributing to tempo. A CC may have a different Main Effort within his component so long as it is directly contributing to the achievement of the higher commander's Main Effort.

c. **Mission Statement.** The JTFC should write his CC's missions personally. A mission should contain a clear, concise statement of the task and its purpose and expressed in terms of: *Who* (the subordinate command), *What* (what the command is to achieve), *When* and *Where* (the parameters) and *Why* (the purpose). Mission statements should always have a unifying purpose (i.e. the 'in order to') and these should fall logically out of the concept of operations. The unifying purposes of subordinates' missions should, when collectively achieved, enable the JTFC to achieve his own mission.

Operational Management

331. Modern joint operations are complex and require careful organisation. A number of control mechanisms exist that are used to order activities in time and space, and to ensure that priorities are clearly understood. JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*' describes in detail the integration, coordination and synchronisation of deployed multinational and national joint operations. The following paragraphs concentrate on those areas in which the operational level commander should play a significant role.

332. **Supported and Supporting Commanders.** The supported/supporting principle is fundamental to joint operations. It is the principal means by which the JTFC designates cross component support and makes clear his resource priorities (within the overall assignment process). Successful management of these relationships will allow the JTFC to shift support for a particular phase, or element of an operation, and maintain operational tempo.

a. The JTFC will direct who is the supported commander for a particular task or operation, although the designation of supported commanders may change several times as the campaign progresses. A CC may act as a supported and supporting commander simultaneously for different but concurrent

¹⁵ Or the adjustment of boundaries, changes to priorities for combat support or logistics, or the use of second echelon forces or reserves.

operations. The supported commander will usually be responsible for the direction of the supporting effort. It follows that the supporting commander(s) should be allowed an opportunity to participate in the planning process and to advise on apportionment decisions and subsequently on the best use of their assets.

b. Allocating Supporting and Supported Commanders is intended to reinforce the notion of Main Effort, not to contradict it. It differs from Main Effort in that a JTFC designates a Main Effort where he seeks a decision or a key outcome.

333. **Sustainability – Logistics and Administration.** The JTFC must plan to organise his command and conduct his campaign to ensure he obtains the optimum fighting power with the greatest reach from his forces and resources, with the least expenditure and waste. In doing so, the 5 principles of logistics (Foresight, Economy, Flexibility, Simplicity and Cooperation)¹⁶ provide the framework, but while making these plans he must bear in mind that the business of supply, maintenance and administration are not the problem, they are part of the solution to the problem. Such plans are vital to the success of a campaign, but without the JTFC's leadership and direction from the outset, they are unlikely to be as effective as they need to be, and under pressure risk collapse and hazard the force.

334. **Monitoring Campaign Progress.** The measurement of success is a fundamental aspect of military operations that should be foremost in the mind of every commander. The process to achieve this is termed Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA).¹⁷ The aim of CEA is to take a broad view of the campaign and determine if the required effects, as envisaged in the plan, are being achieved. This monitoring is much wider than observing whether an individual target has been destroyed (i.e. Battle Damage Assessment). CEA is particularly relevant in activities where the emphasis is on changing the attitudes of the adversary rather than on his physical destruction. Whatever the nature of the campaign, the JTFC should ensure that a monitoring and assessment process is rigorously conducted.

335. **Managing Lines of Operation.** Lines of Operation show the interrelationship between Decisive Points and as such, they are a way of visualising the overall activity within a JTF, and co-ordinating and deconflicting component activities. Careful management of Lines of Operation allows the realisation of the full potential of the JTF. Two tools, which can assist in this, are the Campaign Plan Schematic¹⁸ and the Synchronisation Matrix. The Campaign Plan Schematic enables the overall plan to be visualised at a glance and can be used to monitor its progress. The Synchronisation

¹⁶ See Chapter 2 of JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*' for an explanation of these principles.

¹⁷ See JWP 5-00, Chapter 2.

¹⁸ See Annex 3D for an example of a Campaign Plan Schematic.

Matrix is the method for planning the co-ordination of activity between components, in time and space, along the path to the objective.

336. **Campaign Rhythm.** Where a commander can consistently decide and act quicker than his opponent, he will generate greater tempo and gain a significant advantage. Campaign Rhythm should therefore be focused on enabling effective and timely decision-making within and between headquarters. It is the principal means by which time, information and activity are managed and directed at providing the right information at the right time so that the right decision can be made. It should never become a self-fulfilling prophecy, it is a means to an end not an end in its own right. Campaign Rhythm is key in creating a 'Command Advantage', i.e. orders and directives that are designed to seek tactical opportunity plus a command structure that has a clear and common view of the situation, can communicate quickly and direct operations.

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ANNEX 3A – JOINT OPERATIONS – SUMMARY OF A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Factor	Historical Impact/Effect	
	Positive	Negative
<p>Political & Military Strategic/Operational Interface Structure. The national structure that links these levels together should have their roles and responsibilities clearly defined; people and organisations within the structure must understand their role within it. Political objectives should be consistent (in terms of number and scope) with the resources and forces available to the operational level. The higher levels should be able to provide clear and consistent direction to the operational level and have command and decision-making processes able to react to operational events in a timely fashion. The structure's reaction time must be consistent with the pace of operations, or sufficient autonomy must be given to the operational level of command in order to allow him respond independently.</p> <p>Capability Awareness. Accurate assessments must be made of enemy, friendly and neutral capabilities to avoid underestimating the enemy and overestimating friendly force capabilities. Capability Awareness therefore encompasses conventional intelligence (force strength, effectiveness and intent), deception and other assessments of intangible factors (morale, training, vulnerabilities). Although the enemy is the main focus, it is important to be aware of, and honest about, own capabilities. The clarity of awareness will be a function determined by the relative effectiveness of each side's intelligence and deception systems balanced against the accuracy of self-assessment.</p> <p>Balanced Force. The components of a joint force should be balanced so that the force is able to control the relevant areas of the battlespace as required; the Fighting Power of these forces must be sufficient to dominate the enemy. The joint force must therefore include forces capable of operating in each of the critical areas of the battlespace to avoid the components fighting in isolation. Since the emergence of air power, a dominant air component, able to project combat power into other areas of the battlespace, has generally been associated with military success.</p>	<p>US/UK - Normandy, 1944. UK- Falklands, 1982. UK - Brunei, 1962.</p> <p>Japan - Malaya, 1941. US/UK - Normandy, 1944. US/UK - Iraq, 1991.</p> <p>US – Central/South-West Pacific, WWII. US - Inchon, Korea 1950. US/UK – Iraq, 1991 & 2003.</p> <p>US/UK- Normandy, 1944.</p>	<p>US – Vietnam. Germany - Normandy, 1944. UK - Suez, 1956.</p> <p>UK - Norway, 1940. UK - Malaya, 1941. Germany - Normandy, 1944.</p> <p>UK- Malaya, 1941. UK- Norway, 1940. Germany - Normandy, 1944.</p> <p>UK - Norway, 1940.</p>
<p>Joint Command. To exploit efficiently the balanced joint force a single JTFC should exercise clear unambiguous authority over all operationally deployed forces. The JTFC should ensure that the forces under his command are operating in a cohesive and mutually supporting way and that resource/force allocations match operational priorities and objectives. The single JTFC provides the interface with the higher military</p>		

and political levels. The JTFC and the joint headquarters provide continuity and a centralised focus to ensure that direction from these higher levels is disseminated in a coherent, consistent form. Multiple points of contact between theatre and the higher levels result in inconsistent information and directions flowing to and from theatre. The JTFC provides an authoritative focus for the provision of accurate, consistent assessments of the operational situation back to the higher levels.	US/UK - Iraq, 2003 and 1991. UK - Falklands, 1982.	UK - Gallipoli, 1915. UK - Greece, 1941.
Joint Warfare. The component forces assigned to the JTFC are trained to operate within an effective joint doctrine that fuses the operating environments together and promotes mutually supporting operations across the battlespace. Equipment, training and/or experience exist to make joint operations possible. Such an approach avoids operations being conducted on a single-Service basis with the components acting in isolation.	US - Inchon, 1956. US - Pacific, WWII. US/UK - Iraq, 1991.	UK - Gallipoli, 1915. UK - Norway, 1940. Argentina - Falklands, 1982.
Logistics. Logistics system must be able to deploy and maintain forces and key battle winning equipments across the spectrum of joint operations. Strategic and operational transport assets must be compatible with strategic and operational level planning.	US/UK - Normandy, 1944. UK - Brunei, 1962. US/UK - Iraq, 1991 & 2003.	UK - Norway, 1940. UK - Malaya, 1941. UK - Greece, 1941.
Coalition Operations. The complexity of joint operations will increase for joint operations conducted with allies. Many potential incompatibilities (language, C2 systems, doctrine, casualty tolerance, technology levels) exist that may degrade operational efficiency and Fighting Power. Alliance objectives must take precedence over the national objectives where they are not in accord.	US/UK - Normandy, 1944. US/UK - Iraq, 2003. NATO - Bosnia, 1995.	UK - Greece, 1941. US/UK - SEAC, WWII. ABDA – 1941.

ANNEX 3B - FORMS OF JOINT MANOEUVRE

Envelopment

3B1. Envelopment is defined as an ‘*offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive position to secure objectives to the enemy's rear*’.¹ Envelopment seeks to bypass an adversary's strength, causing him to redeploy, withdraw, or expose his Centre of Gravity (CoG); ultimately the effect on his command and control may be so catastrophic as to cause him to collapse. As such it requires considerable speed of movement, hinges on the accurate identification of weak points, and, in order to distract his attention and present a dilemma, will normally require diversionary attacks against his main form of defence. Envelopment may be undertaken with a view to outflanking, ousting or trapping an adversary and may be conducted across the entire joint battlespace. Within the littoral, amphibious forces may form either the enveloping force or provide the diversionary element. With a vertical envelopment, airmobile or airborne forces may be employed as part of an enveloping force. Double envelopment is an envelopment operation mounted on two axes, designed to outflank an enemy from both sides with a view to: forcing him to abandon his intentions, causing a general withdrawal; or as a prelude to the encirclement and defeat of the forces trapped. This form of manoeuvre particularly lends itself to a joint effort, where the enveloping ‘pincers’ may be from different components or inserted by air.




Figure 3B.1 - Envelopment

¹ AAP-6 ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’.

Turning Movement

3B2. A turning movement is defined as a *‘variation of the envelopment in which the attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives deep in the enemy’s rear to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the threat’*.² Again, as with the envelopment, the overall effect is to make the adversary’s strengths irrelevant, but the critical aspect here is deep. This may result in objectives being taken with little fighting, except in the initial stages, or the adversary having to deploy reserves at some distance from their main body. It is potentially riskier than envelopment, but the rewards may be greater.




Figure 3B.2 - Turning Movement

Encirclement

3B3. If the ‘pincers’ of a double envelopment are able to link-up having trapped a force, and are sufficiently strong to prevent an encircled force from breaking out, or a relief force from breaking in, significant enemy combat power may be neutralized. However, large encirclement operations are costly in terms of forces and in the time taken to ‘besiege’ the trapped adversary.

² AAP-6.




Figure 3B.3 - Encirclement

Penetration

3B4. Each of the forms of manoeuvre seeks to reach the adversary's depth, or even his CoG, by penetration of his outer 'crust' on one or a number of narrow fronts. The fundamental aim is to strike deep as rapidly as possible, and without becoming decisively engaged en route. The obvious risk is to the expanding flanks of the penetrating force and the protection of these flanks is critical to success (although protection can be achieved by the shock and inertia created by the sheer speed of the penetrating force). Moreover, these penetrations are difficult to sustain and are at risk of envelopment or encirclement themselves; at least local air superiority over the attacking forces is critical. When part of an envelopment, encirclement or turning movement, the commander must be alive to the possibility of the effect of the penetration being so dramatic as to cause a change to the original purpose of the operation. Exploitation of any penetration will require balance across the force, detailed contingency planning and a flexible and responsive command and control architecture, so as to be ready to reinforce success.

Interior and Exterior Lines

3B5. The concept of interior and exterior lines applies to both manoeuvre and logistics. If a force is interposed between 2 or more adversary forces, it is said to be operating on interior lines. Thus the force is able to move against any of the opposing forces, or switch its resources over a shorter distance than its adversary. Such a concept depends on the terrain and the state of mobility of both sides. In Figure 3B.4, the defending force (Force B) has a shorter distance to move in order to reinforce its force elements in contact. The attacking force (Force A) has a greater distance to travel to switch resources across its 3 operations (A1, A2, A3).





Figure 3B.4 - Interior and Exterior Lines

Integrating Forms of Manoeuvre within Joint Operations

3B6. The forms of joint manoeuvre described above provide the Joint Task Force Commander with a range of options, within his overall campaign plan, for the achievement of the mission. For example, an encirclement will typically require at least two penetrations, exploitation into the enemy's depth, and a link-up operation. That may be followed by defence of the outer flanks of the encirclement, and either attack or defence on the internal flanks. Such operations require agile forces (and considerable co-ordination effort) who by physical manoeuvre can create shock and surprise at several levels, and hence the possibility of command paralysis and collapse. Any penetration will present an opportunity for exploitation, or create risk to own forces; an operational reserve must be provided to deal with either eventuality. These options may become discrete component tasks, making best use of the individual strengths of each component to create a synergistic effect.³

³ The component contributions to joint operations are described in JWP 3-00 'Joint Operations Execution', Annex 1C.

ANNEX 3C – AN OVERVIEW OF CAMPAIGNING



3C1. The schematic above depicts the relationship between Operational Art, Operational Design and Operational Management as the three main subsets of Campaigning, highlighting the pivotal role played by the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) in ‘energising the circuits’ within a Joint Task Force. As the top part of the diagram shows, the Campaign Planning Concepts (CPCs), although relevant across the campaign planning process, have particular utility in certain areas. In this sense the CPCs can be seen as a bridge between Operational Art and Operational Design; more *campaigning concepts* than simply *planning tools*.

3C2. Centre of Gravity (CoG) Analysis, Campaign Fulcrum and the Decisive Act are particularly pertinent to the identification of what will be decisive; the essence of Operational Art.


3C3. Operational Design is used to lay out the way in which the operation might unfold. Lines of Operation and Decisive Points (DPs) map out the common threads and stepping stones required to unlock the adversary CoG. Sequencing, Contingency Planning (Branches and Sequels) and Operational Pauses are ways of structuring the application of resources to ensure that force is concentrated at the right time and place, while retaining the initiative.

3C4. Operational Management is essentially the use of a series of control measures to ensure the campaign plan remains on track.

3C5. The Campaign Planning Concepts:

End-state	The end-state is that state of affairs which needs to be achieved either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable terms. It is a crucial element of any plan for without it there is no focus to which campaign planning can be directed. All activities and operations should be judged against their relevance to achieving the end-state.
Centre of Gravity	The CoG is that aspect of the adversary's overall capability which, if attacked and eliminated, will lead either to his inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through negotiations. The initial analysis of the adversary CoG requires constant re-appraisal both during the planning and execution phases of an operation, as does the protection of friendly CoGs (see Paragraph 324 for CoG Analysis).
Decisive Points	While it may be possible to defeat the adversary's CoG by direct attack, it is more likely that a series of co-ordinated actions will be required. Such actions are described as DPs. DPs are arranged along Lines of Operation leading to the adversary's CoG. They need not necessarily constitute a battle or physical engagement, nor need they have a geographical relevance. The key is the effect that the actions have on the adversary. The acid test of a DP is that its removal from a Campaign Plan in the planning phase would prejudice the overall coherence of the plan and, during the execution, failure to achieve a DP would threaten the plan's viability.
Lines of Operation	Lines of Operation establish the inter-relationship, in time and space, between DPs and the CoG. They can be functional or environmental.
Sequencing and Phases	Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the adversary's CoG. Once the overall sequencing of the operation has been determined, the commander may choose to divide his campaign into phases. Phasing is a useful way of describing where an operation cannot be developed until set activities are complete or a change to task organisation is required. The conditions that must be satisfied for the start and end of each phase must be clearly defined and care must be taken to maintain tempo between phases.
Contingency Planning	Contingency planning is the process by which options are built into the plan to take into account opportunities or reverses. There are two broad approaches to contingency planning. Branches are options within a particular phase, providing the commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative. Sequels are options for the next phase, one of which may be the next pre-planned phase. Branches and sequels are developed both during initial campaign planning and during the conduct of the campaign.
Operational Pause	As land operations cannot be conducted continuously, there may be a need for periodic pauses, while initiative is retained in other ways, perhaps in other environments. Ideally, the Operational Pause should be planned in order to minimise any overall loss of tempo. It is sometimes necessary to pause on one Line of Operation in order to concentrate activity on another. Implicit in the term 'pause' is the ability to re-activate the Line of Operation in order to maintain momentum and the initiative.
Culminating Point	The current definition of a culminating point is ' <i>an operation reaches its culminating point when it can just be maintained but not developed to any great advantage.</i> ' (JWP 0-01.1). This is to do with 'running out of steam'; a single operation which is unsustainable or where the intended effect is no longer achievable. The value of attempting to identify the Culminating Point is so as to be prepared to exploit fully the potential of this event, or plan Operational Pauses in order to avoid it. Intelligence, operations and logistic staffs need to liaise closely to avoid, delay the onset, or minimise their effects of, a Culminating Point.

ANNEX 3D – A CAMPAIGN PLANNING SCHEMATIC



1. Decisive Points are sequenced in time and space on Lines of Operation. They are the key to unlocking the CoG, and without their completion the CoG cannot be defeated or neutralised. This sequencing can be assisted by Phases.
2. Lines of Operation can be environmental or functional or a mixture of both. They should not be decided until the Decisive Points have been derived and the critical path identified.
3. Operational Pauses may be introduced where necessary. Momentum must be maintained elsewhere.
4. Culmination Point is reached when an operation or battle can just be maintained but not developed to any great advantage.
5. Branches are contingency plans which can be introduced to Lines of Operation whenever necessary, and are continuously refined as the campaign develops.
6. Sequels are contingency plans introduced when phases are not completed as planned.

7. The adversary CoG at the operational level is that which most resists the end-state. Without the neutralisation or destruction of the adversary's CoG, the end-state cannot be reached. Activity, necessary to finally achieve the end-state conditions, may take place after its destruction or neutralisation, but this will not be decisive or critical. It may be useful to show own CoG as it is the thing that needs protecting most, and is therefore that which the adversary is likely to direct his efforts against.
8. The end-state provides the focus for campaign planning and all activities should be judged against their relevance to its achievement. The operational end-state will usually be given by the Military Strategic Authority and may be a list of objectives or a statement. It needs analysis in order to identify measurable conditions which together indicate that the end-state has been achieved.
9. It may be useful to include a line showing key events. These might be the deadline for compliance with a UN resolution, the date an adversary 2nd Echelon force might be ready for combat, the estimated time for the completion of mobilisation, or the holding of the first free and fair elections.

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CHAPTER 4 – COMMAND AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The purpose of Chapter 4 is to explain the nature of command at this level in a joint and multinational context. It provides a link between the theory in Chapter 3 and the more practical nature of Chapter 5.

Section I – A Command Philosophy

Section II – The Nature of Operational Level Command

Section III – Command Relationships

Section IV – Decision-Making

Section V – Mechanics of Command

SECTION I – A COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

“An operational level commander’s focus must be to marry the ‘Means’ and the ‘Ways’, to change the situation to advantage, to win not just to survive. ‘When, to whom and to what purpose’ is the business of operational command.”

General Sir Rupert Smith

401. At the heart of the campaign sits the operational level commander. Through the use of Operational Art and Operational Design, and drawing on his own intuition, the operational level commander aims to identify what it is that will be decisive and to determine the most effective and economical employment of his forces; in other words to decide on the ‘Ways’. Operational Management is the method by which he controls the application of the ‘Means’ at his disposal – the components – to achieve a successful outcome.

402. There are four facets to the UK’s command philosophy: a clear understanding of the superior commander’s intention, a responsibility on the part of subordinates to meet the superior’s intent, the importance of making a timely decision and determination on the part of the commander to see the plan through to a successful conclusion. It is a philosophy designed to achieve unity of effort, and one which relies on mutual trust and understanding. This philosophy requires a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative – but one which remains responsive to superior direction.

403. Mission command is the way in which this philosophy is implemented. Its application should take into account both the situation and the ability and level of training of subordinate commanders. It has the following key elements:

- a. First, a commander ensures that his subordinates understand his intentions, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context.
- b. Second, subordinates are told *what* effect they are to achieve and the reason *why* it is necessary.
- c. Third, subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.
- d. Fourth, a commander uses a minimum of control so as not to limit unnecessarily his subordinates' freedom of action.
- e. Finally, subordinates decide for themselves *how* best to achieve their missions.

404. Military command at all levels is a function of decision-making and leadership. Command is the '*authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces*'.¹ Military leadership is the projection of personality and character to get a force to do what is required of it. There is no prescription for good leadership; it may be a product of persuasion, compulsion, force of personality, charm or any combination of techniques. What is clear is that the commander should understand what motivates his force; the force in turn should understand his intentions and trust his leadership. When cracks appear, as inevitably they will, the commander will have to call upon all his leadership skills to re-build the morale and motivation of the force. Although command at the higher levels remains founded on the traditional qualities of leadership, it requires a wider range of qualities and skills.

SECTION II – THE NATURE OF OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMAND

405. **The Personal Dimension.** Command at this level, where the stakes are high, requires a combination of cerebral, moral and physical qualities. Command is personal and different types of commanders are required for different circumstances; there is no unique formula or right combination of qualities. Important though a commander's personal qualities may be, it is by his actions that he will invariably be judged. It is important, therefore, that strategic level commanders have a choice of whom they select for operational level command to fit the circumstances. To be effective an operational level commander must have at least the *confidence* of his superiors and subordinates and his allies to get the job done (e.g. Wingate and Montgomery). In other circumstances *trust*, the ability to build or contribute to a

¹ JWP 0-01.1 '*United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*'.

disparate coalition, may be more valuable (e.g. Alexander and Eisenhower). Ideally a combination of *trust* and *confidence* is required. These difficult considerations may also affect the tasks an operational level commander gives his subordinates and are especially sensitive in a multinational context.

406. **Key Qualities.** Views differ on the balance of qualities required for command at the higher levels. Clausewitz, for example, described two ‘indispensable’ qualities of command: “*First, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may go*”. Field Marshal Montgomery described command as: “*... the capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which inspires confidence*”. Field Marshal Bagnall thought that “*intelligence, imagination, decisiveness and judgement*” were the key qualities of a commander. Churchill’s view was that: “*There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination but also an element of legerdemain, an original queer and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten*”. All four quotations are as valid now as they were when they were written.

407. **The Manoeuvrist Approach and the Operational Level Commander.** The manoeuvrist approach emphasises: ‘*initiative ... doing the unexpected ... originality ... ruthless determination to succeed*’.² These themes relate directly to command at the operational level and are worthy of emphasis:

- a. The commander who endeavours to outwit his opponent is the one most likely to achieve success on operations; remembering always that he is seeking to surprise and confuse the adversary, not his own command. The use of imagination and innovation, to be unpredictable, has enormous potential benefits, but is completely reliant on a true understanding of the opponent.
- b. He should be calm and cool-headed when the situation is confused and the effects of friction are at their greatest; ‘*crisis-proof*’. High personal morale and a spirit that triumphs in the face of adversity are valuable qualities. As Field Marshall Wavell put it: “*The first essential of a general is the quality of robustness, the ability to stand the shocks of war*”.
- c. The ability to think quickly and take difficult decisions is the mark of a strong commander and rests on the ability to cut to the essentials, plus a timely recognition of the circumstances and moment demanding a new decision. Although judgement when to make a quick decision is important, so is recognising when not to.

² JWP 0-01 ‘British Defence Doctrine’ (BDD) (2nd Edition), Chapter 3.

d. A manoeuvrist approach requires commanders who seek the initiative, who act boldly, identifying and exploiting fleeting opportunities while balancing the potential pay-off with the risk involved.

e. Once engaged, his every being should be concentrated on achieving his object come what may. In a confused and highly charged situation, the will to win calls for determination and relentlessness: an ability to drive through difficulties, to be strong willed, but not stubborn. Important as slick and effective operational procedures and clear doctrine are, fundamental is the generation and fostering of fighting spirit. As van Creveld observes: “... *where fighting spirit is lacking everything else is just a waste of time*”.

408. **Joint Considerations.** Having spent the majority of his career in a single Service, it is inevitable that the operational level commander will be conditioned by the ethos and culture of his own Service. His leadership style will have been adapted to the particular needs of his Service and his understanding of one of the components will be greater. His training and education, although increasingly joint at later stages, will have been focused on enabling him to be an effective member of his own Service, for the UK recognises that for an officer to be effective in the joint environment requires professionalism in his parent Service. Under stress he may revert to familiar patterns or language which may be unfamiliar to others and cause some misunderstanding. The commander should recognise this, as should his subordinate commanders and his staff, and adjust accordingly. This is not a difficult or complicated issue, simply an aspect of command relationships in a joint environment that should be recognised and taken into account.

409. **The National Contingent Commander.** There are 3 main circumstances in which a UK commander may find himself operating at the operational level: as a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) in a national operation; as a JTFC in a multinational operation where the UK is acting as lead or framework nation; or as a National Contingent Commander (NCC) where the UK is contributing forces to an operation led by another nation. A NCC is a ‘fighting commander’ but not in the same sense as the multinational (MN) JTFC. Nonetheless he is a key decision-maker and plays a pivotal role alongside the MN JTFC in building the coalition. Although he does not share the same command responsibility or authority within the multinational force as the MN JTFC, he must understand the operation to the same extent in order to provide effective advice. As such he will need a joint staff capable of providing appropriate support across the normal staff functions (e.g. J1, J2, J3 (mainly Media and Information Operations), J4, J5 (much reduced) and J6).

a. In general terms, the role of the NCC is to:

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shape the coalition based on personal relationships. • Advise, encourage and warn Allies. • Apply rigour to planning based on command and staff input. • Watch the levels of risk to the winning concept. 	<i>INFLUENCE</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approve the use of UK Forces (within delegated powers). • Act as figurehead (Moral Component of Fighting Power). • Practise Mission Command. • Build contingent cohesion. • Provide logistics, CIS and legal advice. 	<i>SUPPORT</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ask for Military Strategic support. • Report tactical incidents and operational developments. • Monitor and manage media interest. 	<i>INFORM</i>

Table 4.1 - Role of the NCC

b. The NCC's early priorities are likely to be to:

- (1) Shape planning for UK forces.
- (2) Refine media plans.
- (3) Check coalition interoperability.
- (4) De-conflict and prioritise, and where appropriate direct, Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI).
- (5) Devise Force Protection policy and posture.
- (6) Build coalition and contingent relationships.

c. He will hold the national 'red card',³ although he will usually delegate elements to his national commanders within each component so that issues can be resolved early at lower levels, thus minimising the overall impact on coalition cohesion. Any issues that are likely to cause friction should be identified beforehand and discussed with the lead nation in an effort to negotiate the problem away. In many ways the NCC's success could be measured against the rarity with which he is forced to use the national veto.

³ National 'red cards' are essentially vetoes over possible or actual aspects of the operation in which a nation will not agree to participate.

d. Cohesion within the components is the bedrock of a successful multinational JTF. Frequently, it is at component level that the options for the use of UK national forces are first considered, and subsequently developed. As such, the selection of UK contingent commanders that are able to win influence with their respective multinational Component Commanders is of prime importance. The NCC will have a clear command relationship with his national commanders embedded in the components, albeit not in a traditional sense. His role is largely to guide and counsel these subordinate commanders in building a strong and effective relationship with their respective Component Commanders, so that they can then influence both the plan and the subsequent employment of UK forces.

SECTION III – COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

410. **The Strategic Commander.** In essence, the role of the Strategic Commander is to ensure, wherever and whenever possible, that the operational level commander is not distracted from the business of planning and executing the campaign or major operation. In multinational operations where the UK is not in the lead, it is important that national issues are attended to by close relationship between the national and operational chain of command. This relationship should be based on professional trust and understanding which flow from:

- a. Personal knowledge of the operational level commander by reputation and by previous encounters. It is important that the Strategic Commander is closely involved in the selection of the operational level commander.
- b. Experience of actual operations, ideally experience which is relevant to the operation at hand.
- c. Education in the operational level of war.

The Operational Commander

411. **Relationship with Component Commanders.** There must be mutual understanding between the operational level commander and his CCs to ensure unity of effort. He should not see them as a 'set' and should ensure that each CC has the necessary access to him and that he displays no national or single-Service preference. He should involve the CCs fully in the campaign planning process and ensure each component is allocated the necessary resources and freedom of action to achieve their mission. His subordinates should be confident in his decisions and follow his direction in the understanding of its spirit. A clear grasp of the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses etc of each component, and fostering a spirit of mutual understanding and trust, is critical to achieving success, and is a key task for the JTFC. He should understand the ethos of each Service and the relevant principles of command, not just

the mechanics but also the underlying logic. This will require more time and effort in a multinational context. *“A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation, and does not demand it from his subordinates.”* Sun Tzu.

412. The Supported Regime. Where a JTF is deployed in support of another government, the JTFC will have a close relationship with the political elements of that regime. In some instances these regimes will be fractured and unstable and one of his key roles will be to support and empower them. As such it will be critical that he fully understands the political context in which he operates. In these circumstances this is likely to be his primary focus and take up the majority of his time.

413. Multinational Dimension. It is very difficult to ‘lead’ another nation’s forces. Welding together the elements of a multinational force into an effective team is the responsibility of the operational level commander and requires political acumen, patience and tact. Allies will often have a different reason for being there and there is no place for prejudice or preconceptions.

a. An understanding of relative strengths and weaknesses (contingent capabilities) and national political objectives and perspectives is essential, as well as a deeper feeling for the effect of previous wars and operations on national ethos and culture, so as to understand the deeper reasons behind national ‘red cards’.⁴ The commander should balance the capabilities of his force elements and play to their strengths, consistent with national constraints. At the same time, he should balance the burden and risk sharing in order to ensure that no one nation either sustains a disproportionate loss of life or, conversely, receives disproportionate credit, both of which may weaken the cohesion of the alliance or coalition.

b. The approach to this problem will, of course, depend to a great extent upon personalities, but success is more likely if, within the coalition, all problems are addressed within the context of the military strategic objectives and, specifically, the campaign plan. If it can be established that although political problems may exist, the real task of the commander and his allied subordinates is to produce a military solution to a military problem, cooperation will be put on a sound basis without offending national sensitivities.

c. Co-operation is enhanced through knowledge, trust, mutual understanding and respect, the seeds of which are sown by contacts, liaison and exchange postings before the operation. Moreover, the operational level commander should do all he can to discuss military problems on a ‘one-to-one’ basis with

⁴ Frequently these are shaped by past experiences, such as: Canada and Vimy Ridge, Netherlands and Srebrenica, Australia and Gallipoli, and the impact of the horrendous casualties in WW1 on the strategy and commanders of WW2.

Ministers and senior officers from contributing nations who visit the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

SECTION IV – DECISION-MAKING

414. Effective decisions are critical to operational success. The JTFC alone makes the decisions and his focus must be on the quality and timing, and the understanding of that decision by subordinates and staff, rather than the method used to reach the decision.

415. **The Decision-Making Process.** Even when a very rapid decision is required, some method in the decision-making process is essential. Commonly understood decision-making tools enable commanders and staffs to work together effectively, in particular when headquarters are assembled at short notice. The 4 stages of the decision-making process are:

- a. **Direction.** The operational level commander's first act should be to determine the nature of the decision required and the time available to him in which to make it. He then needs to issue sufficient planning guidance to his staff and subordinates to set in hand all the action required to enable him subsequently to arrive at his decision in an orderly and timely fashion.
- b. **Consultation.** In the second stage, if time allows, consultation occurs at 3 levels:
 - (1) Upwards to the strategic level commander to seek guidance if required, and also to ensure he is kept abreast of the operational level commander's intentions and vice-versa.
 - (2) Sideways, in particular to senior national representatives, agencies and his own specialist advisers and senior staff.
 - (3) Downwards to his component commanders to ensure that they understand his decision, have the opportunity to contribute to it and feel a sense of ownership in it.
- c. **Consideration.** Before reaching his decision the commander should consider the contributions of his component commanders and the work of his staff from the direction stage, and then apply his judgement, influenced by any consultation upwards that has been possible.
- d. **Decision and Execution.** The commander must make decisions personally and express these decisions clearly and succinctly; this is the cornerstone of effective command. Thereafter, he must ensure that his direction

is disseminated in the manner he requires and that his decision is executed correctly. In the words of General Patton: *“Promulgation of an order represents not over 10 percent of your responsibility. The remaining 90 per cent consists in assuring through personal supervision proper and vigorous execution”*.

416. The Process in Practice. Consultation, consideration and decision-making will frequently be compressed and activities undertaken concurrently rather than consecutively. The time by which a decision has to be taken may be self evident from the circumstances but, if not, it should be clearly established during the direction stage. Consultation and consideration may become inseparably blended, leading to decisions being taken on the spot. Reaching a decision will invariably involve the commander exercising his own judgement on incomplete information. Risk cannot be avoided; to wait in hopeful anticipation of complete clarification will result in paralysis. The risk can be reduced if critical information requirements are identified early in contingency planning in both peacetime and the lead-up to conflict and regularly refined by the operational level commander. Commanders should possess the judgement to know what to delegate and to whom. They should be clear that whilst they may delegate their authority, they always retain responsibility.

417. Decision-Making in a Multinational Environment. Effective decisions in a multinational environment can be viewed as a combination of quality thinking and acceptance. In a situation where many nations are present, the importance of acceptance and the difficulty of doing quality thinking quickly is obvious, particularly in a headquarters that may be ad hoc or inexperienced. The key is not to wait until the decision has been made before working on acceptance, but to get ‘buy-in’ early by as much collaborative planning as is possible under the prevailing circumstances.

418. Understanding the Nature of the Problem. It is only by understanding the true nature of the problem that the commander will be able to make the high quality decisions required of him. Strategic guidance, the operational estimate and the intelligence process will help the commander in this respect. But a true understanding of the more intangible and wider factors surrounding the issue will come only from research, study, visits and discussions with key military and non-military people. Some of this will come from previous experience but this ‘feel’ should be developed rapidly from the moment the operational level commander is appointed and continue throughout the campaign. Developing an instinctive feel for the operational environment will help the commander in deciding *when* to make decisions and in the making of those decisions. Charles de Gaulle put it this way: *“Great war leaders have always been aware of the importance of instinct. Was not what Alexander called his ‘hope’, Caesar his ‘luck’ and Napoleon his ‘star’ simply the fact that they knew they had a particular gift of making contact with realities sufficiently closely to dominate them”*.

419. **Critical Decisions.** Apart from the selection of a winning concept, there are very few *critical* decisions that the commander at the operational level will consistently be called upon to make, but those he makes are likely to determine the success or failure of the campaign. Amongst the significant decisions an operational level commander might be called upon to make, 3 stand out:

- a. **The Initial Positioning of the Force.** The initial positioning of the force in the JOA, particularly the land component, is vital, as subsequent re-positioning of force elements will rarely be practicable or even possible. An operational level commander should focus on what he is trying to achieve in the JOA and work back from this to determine the initial positioning of his force.
- b. **The Designation of the Main Effort.** It is vital that the operational commander designates his Main Effort in order to focus the activities of the force on those actions that he deems to be of a critical nature. Shifting Main Effort requires careful consideration and should not be done to a prearranged timetable. Shift too often and there is a danger of dissipating combat power instead of achieving concentration, although the Main Effort should be able to be shifted quickly as it can be an excellent way to reinforce the exploitation of an unforeseen opportunity.
- c. **The Committal of the Operational Level Reserve or Second Echelon Force.** If the commander elects to keep an operational level reserve, the decision to commit that reserve force/effort rests solely with him. Two factors bear upon this decision: timely committal and security of the force. The commander must have a good understanding of the deployment and transit times of the reserve so as to have the desired effect on the enemy - too early or too late can have disastrous consequences. The commander should also mask his intentions to increase the uncertainty of the enemy and thus amplify, once committed, the effects of reserve/echelon forces.

SECTION V – MECHANICS OF COMMAND

420. **Command, Control and Communications Architecture.** The UK's command 'model' is explained in detail in JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*' and shown in outline in Annex 4A. It sets out the standard arrangements for command and control of deployed joint operations, including guidance on command states for NATO and coalition operations. It is, however, only one approach and should not be applied rigidly. Although there are others, the major considerations when deciding on, and subsequently adjusting, the command and control architecture both external to and within a deployed force are listed below.⁵ They are closely interlinked and should be

⁵ The Operational Tasking Group (see JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*', Chapter 1) will recommend overall C2 arrangements for CDS's approval and subsequent endorsement by Ministers.

considered as a set. Although the JTFC may not have any influence on the arrangements, he should understand the reasoning behind the in-place arrangements.


- a. **The Problem.** The scale, nature, range and likely duration of the operation, noting especially that the ‘problem’ will continue to evolve. Concurrency will also be an issue; there may be a number of operations running, at different states of maturity and with different profiles.
- b. **Influence.** Where and how best to apply influence, to allies but also to key decision-makers at home. The identification of the point (or points) where the greatest influence can be brought to bear is vital in a multinational operation. It will not always be the one that is immediately obvious, and it will fluctuate as the operation develops. Once identified, the best approach must be decided, bearing in mind that what works for one level may not be appropriate elsewhere. In all circumstances the ability to exert influence is underpinned by the contribution of credible and robust military forces.
- c. **Command.** Where and how best to exercise command of the JTF or the UK’s contribution, within the UK’s command philosophy. This philosophy, which is described in Section I, highlights 4 key facets - ‘*decentralised command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative*’ - and the importance of Mission Command in delivering this approach.
- d. **Communications.** What the capacity of the available Communications and Information Systems (CIS) assets is, including any redundancy. Modern CIS assets allow greater reach-back and discussions and referral between the deployed force and pol/mil decision-makers. But even with the sophistication of modern communications there will be occasions where face-to-face discussions are required. Whatever the situation, communications should enable, not emasculate, the exercise of command.

421. **A Commander’s Relationship with his Staff.** The force of the commander’s personality, leadership, command style and general behaviour will have a direct bearing on the morale, sense of direction and performance of his staff. Thus commanders should:

- a. Set standards and be clear as to what they expect from the staff. The first duty of the staff, at any level, is to state the practical truth.
- b. Create and maintain a climate that encourages subordinates to think independently and to take the initiative. Encourage timely action. Ensure that the staff understand that they serve those beneath them.
- c. Create a climate of mutual loyalty and respect rather than one which is sycophantic and unquestioning: the ability to tolerate ‘loyal opposition’.

d. Foster a sense of involvement in decision-making and of shared commitment; empower where appropriate. Pay particular attention to the delegated authority and responsibility within the core team (Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Political Adviser, and the Deputy Commander if one is present).

ANNEX 4A – THE UK COMMAND AND CONTROL MODEL



1. The Operational Level provides the vital link or 'gearing' between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces.
2. MOD Head Office and PJHQ are the 'Military Strategic Authority'. It is CDS, as the national Strategic Commander, who provides 'politically aware' military advice drawing on advice from COS Committee.
3. PJHQ operate mainly at the operational level but, as part of the DCMO, get involved in military strategic issues.
4. CDS issues a Directive to the Jt Comd setting out Ends, Ways and Means. The Jt Comd's Mission Directive adds further detail to cover the deployment, sustainment and recovery of UK forces. The Operational level commander (JTFC/NCC) conducts an Operational Estimate to translate this strategic direction into tactical effect, i.e. the employment of forces. As a broad rule, FULL COMD is retained by the UK, Jt Comd exercises OPCOM, JTFC/NCC is delegated at least OPCOM.
5. The major considerations when deciding on, and subsequently adjusting, the 'model' are: **The Problem:** The scale, nature, range and likely duration of the operation. **Influence:** Where and how best to apply influence, to Allies but also to key decision-makers at home. **Command:** Where and how best to exercise command of the joint force or the UK's contribution, within the UK's command philosophy. **Communications:** What is the capacity of the available CIS assets, including any redundancy.

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CHAPTER 5 – CAMPAIGN EXECUTION

Using the theory set out in Chapters 3 and 4, and within the context described in Part 1, the purpose of Chapter 5 is to set out how the JTFC might think about ‘solving the problem’, highlighting the key issues to be considered when conceiving and applying a winning concept.

Section I – Initial Considerations

Section II – The Selection of a Winning Concept

Section III – The Implementation of a Winning Concept

Section IV – Campaign Termination

SECTION I – INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

“The operational level commander stands astride the political/military interface with his weight on the military foot. His mastery of the art of war, tested against that of his opponent, links the successful achievement of the strategic objective with the actions of his command. He must have a broad understanding of the science of war but it is he, and he alone, who paints the masterpiece.”

General Sir Rupert Smith

Early Activity

501. The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) should be appointed as early as possible so that he can have the greatest influence on the way in which the campaign is constructed. On appointment he will be given some form of guidance, normally in the form of a directive. In addition he will usually receive a series of briefings from the Military Strategic Authority and, in some instances, from the Front Line Commands.

502. At this point he will be firmly in the spotlight and there will be a number of competing demands placed on him. He will be receiving a flood of information from a wide range of sources and there will be a thousand questions and thoughts racing round in his head:

- a. How do I get my mind around this problem?
- b. Who is dealing with what?
- c. What work has been produced and what is in hand?
- d. Who are the key personalities (national and multinational)?
- e. How do I get the right information feeds?

503. Time, inevitably, will be short and he cannot do everything and be everywhere. His intellectual effort in these early stages is critical and he must do for himself, or control, those activities where his experience and expertise are paramount. It is imperative that he quickly gathers his team around him and gives clear and early direction, including priorities, to get everybody properly focused and working purposefully. The key players are his Chief of Staff (COS), Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) and Political Advisor (POLAD) and he should have a say in their selection.

Planning

“I will not on any account be drawn away from first principles: that it is for commanders to make plans and give decisions, and staffs then to work out the details of those plans; on no account will I have a plan forced on me by a planning staff.”

Field Marshal Montgomery

504. Planning should be viewed as intellectual activity which drives a process, not a process which drives intellectual activity. The drive in this sense comes from the JTFC and comprises intuition (a combination of experience and intelligence) and effective decision-making (timely and informed).

505. Figure 5.1 shows the fundamental elements of deployed joint operations; it is the essence of the theory contained in Chapters 3 and 4. It illustrates the principal activities of a commander and his staff in planning and executing a campaign, irrespective of the nature of the problem at hand, the scale of the forces involved, or the technological sophistication of available Communications and Information Systems. The commander, who is likely to have the greatest intuition, bears most on the identification of that which is likely to prove decisive and is the best judge of a course of action (CoA) that has the greatest chance of success. His staff, working on quality direction from him, work up the details. Both commander and staff are involved in the detailed management.




Figure 5.1 - The Fundamentals of Joint Operations

506. The rest of this Chapter concentrates on 2 key questions for the JTFC that fall out of this model. Both can be answered collaboratively and are not necessarily solely for him to answer; a balance is required, particularly if time is short. They are:

- a. How do I select a winning concept?
- b. How do I then successfully implement that winning concept?

SECTION II – THE SELECTION OF A WINNING CONCEPT

“It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal. To this end it is necessary to decide the development of operations before the initial blow is delivered.”

Liddel Hart

507. The selection of a course of action by the JTFC that, in his opinion, stands the best chance of achieving the end-state and contributes fully to the strategic goal rests totally on understanding: an understanding of the operating environment, of the complete problem which has been set, and the forces and resources available. Only with this understanding is there a chance that a plan of action can be derived which is likely to succeed.

508. This understanding will grow with time and any plan should allow for this. In the early stages activity is not about the construction of an overly detailed and

inflexible plan, nor should it be misconstrued as the promotion of an ad hoc approach – simply muddling through. Planning should be broad enough not to constrain downstream, and detailed enough to allow subordinate commanders and staffs to undertake the activity necessary to begin planning, training and deployment of forces. It is a very difficult balance to achieve and one which relies heavily on early intellectual rigour and close engagement by the JTFC.

The Operating Environment

509. **The Joint Battlespace.** Joint operations are conducted in the joint battlespace – the multi-dimensional environment embracing the Joint Operations Area (JOA).¹ This battlespace can be described as having 6 overlapping and inter-related dimensions: the 3 conventional dimensions of the earth's surface – land, sea (including subsurface) and air (including space); the electromagnetic spectrum; time; and the information domain. Operations take place within the 3 component environments - maritime, land and air - each of which span several dimensions. It is, however, unlikely that the battlespace will conform to a neat spectrum of conditions. Risks and challenges will be multi-layered, simultaneous, non-linear and difficult to predict, bringing with them additional pressures at all levels. The essence of the military use of the battlespace is to exploit all its dimensions for one's own advantage whilst denying their use to an adversary.

510. **A Way of Understanding the Operating Environment.** The modern operating environment is complex and requires an integrated approach: integrated across the instruments of power and a number of agencies and actors. The nature of the operating environment in which the Joint Task Force (JTF) will operate requires close examination, not simply better to understand it, but in order to see how it might be shaped and altered to advantage, and the way in which it might limit the planning and conduct of the campaign. Understanding this environment will give the JTFC a better feel for time, timing and consequence; when to do something, how long to do it for and what the resultant effects² will be of that action. Although the focus here is within the JOA, military activities will also be subject to external influences. For example, the military, at all levels, will be under constant media scrutiny; in many cases, both the media and other civilian agencies will be in the JOA before military forces have even deployed. There are several factors that characterise the operating environment that the JTFC will need to consider:

¹ The JOA is 'an area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area is contingency/mission specific.' (JWP 0-01.1 '*United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*').

² Effects can be: Intended/Unintended, Desired/Un-desired, Positive/Negative, Expected/Unexpected, Kinetic/Cognitive, Instantaneous/Delayed, Localised/Distributed, Permanent/Temporary or a combination thereof.

- a. Military forces can be used to stabilise a situation, and/or to enforce or intervene for a particular reason. What differentiates these from each other is: the level of threat, both to the force and to the individual; the potential for combat; the varying number of other actors and their importance at different levels; and who is co-operating and who is actively resisting. All of which are variables not absolutes. These main influences are shown at Figure 5.2.
- b. Operations do not develop in a linear way, with neat transition phases, all carefully controlled by some detailed and rigid master campaign plan. They evolve and fluctuate at different levels, in different ways and in different places. But by looking at a situation in this way, certain questions can be identified which can assist in the determination of an initial framework for the size, shape, capabilities and focus for a military force, and inform subsequent discussions on campaign termination and transition.
- c. It is important to view this environment as a continuum not a spectrum. Elements within the force may operate under different conditions at different times. A formation which is acting in support of a wide range of civil actors may be experiencing more contacts than another formation in the same JOA with less of a civil interface but a higher combat posture and which is manoeuvring in a more traditional sense. This may also apply down to lower levels, and even to individual units that may be operating across a broad range of activity within the wider campaign.




Figure 5.2 - The Operating Environment

511. **Commander's Assessment.** Having viewed his operating environment in this way, and gained a deeper understanding of the situation, the JTFC is then in a better position to assess:

- a. **The Threat.** What is the nature of the threat and how and where will it manifest itself? What does this mean for the Rules of Engagement profile? It is not sufficient to focus solely on a military opponent; in some cases there will be no defined protagonists in the conventional military sense.
- b. **The Likelihood of Combat.** Does this threat have greater individual or force connotations? Given the threat, how to manoeuvre the force in the face of the threat – in a traditional sense or is a different approach required? What force structures and capabilities are required? What about the level and extent of multinationality?
- c. **Civil/Military Interaction.** How to interact with both indigenous and external agencies? The needs of an indigenous or displaced population are also likely to impact on the mission. A civil population can be considered as having 5 broad elements: hostiles, obstacles, neutrals, aides and allies. Whatever the composition, it is unlikely to be a unitary block all with common viewpoints and motivations, both of which are liable to change over time or in response to the actions of the force. This interaction may be the crucial flank?
- d. **Consent and Compliance.**³ What is the basis of authority and legitimacy and how could it be undermined? What is the level of consent and compliance and where does it vary/is it uncertain? What does this mean for force posture? Is compliance enough or does it need to be turned into consent? If so where?

Identifying and Analysing the Complete Problem

512. **Information.** Information in itself serves little useful purpose; it is knowledge that brings power. An increase in the quantity of information and an increase in the quality of information are not synonymous. More channels often mean low-grade spurious and specious information. Such a barrage of information can make it even more difficult to discern the big picture or to identify the key issues against this background noise. The JTFC should design his own information framework and be confident of the quality of his information, especially that which will directly influence his critical decisions.

513. **Background to the Problem.** This should start by considering the geo-strategic context to provide the backdrop to a closer examination of the problem, but consider it for its military significance to *all* sides. Climate and topographical detail will be important; sources of water and energy, and givens such as fixed points and their implications (e.g. Suez Canal, Rhine crossings), will shape courses of action and responses. Analyse the people, their wealth, society and culture, their neighbours and their relationships. A thorough understanding of culture and civilisation is critical to

³ *Consent* implies **freely given** permission or approval whereas *compliance* is more to do with **enforced** submission.

the campaign. Consider carefully the underlying issues and their regional settings, not only in a contemporary perspective, but in a deeper historical sense. It is important to strike a balance between the opponent and the strategic objective, not overly concentrate on one. This avoids the possibility of militarily beating an opponent but not achieving, or setting conditions for achieving, the strategic goals. *Always* consider allies. What are their political goals and how might they affect the conduct of the campaign? What are they prepared to risk in ‘blood and treasure’?

514. Considering the Problem. This relates to Step 2 of the Operational Estimate⁴ which breaks the problem into 2 parts: the allocated *mission* and the *object* of that mission. In doing this analysis, the JTFC seeks to achieve absolute clarity about his role in the strategic plan.

- a. What is the desired political end and the driving logic behind it? Is military force expected to achieve the desired end, in which case the military strategic objective should lead directly to the political end. Consider the relationship between the opposing driving logics; until this is understood it is difficult to affect an adversary’s will and guard one’s own.
- b. What constitutes a decisive action, in political, geo-strategic and military terms? Military force is rarely the decisive act at the strategic level but will usually set a condition without which the strategic goal could not be achieved. Is the adversary seeking a strategically decisive military act or is his military objective to set a condition? The less directly opposed the objectives, the harder it is to use military force strategically.
- c. What utility has force in relation to the operational and strategic end-states? The ability to bring great force to bear may suit the more immediate military goals but be counter-productive in the long-term.
- d. The object of the mission is the thing on which the mission bears, or which provides greatest resistance to the mission. As this will often be the adversary (which may be an alliance), a thorough examination of both his capabilities and the underpinning ethos is of fundamental importance. Consider the way he operates and the size and organisation of his forces in relation to one’s own force. Draw out his relative strengths and weaknesses, his Centre of Gravity (CoG) and Critical Vulnerabilities. The utility of one’s own forces relative to the adversary can thus be assessed and a decision made in principle as to whether to approach directly or indirectly. This line of reasoning will inform the decision as to the organisation of the components. What are the opposing logics and methods of command? The more the objective is to establish a condition, and the more one’s actions are to achieve an effect, the

⁴ Summary at Annex 5A and detailed explanation in JWP 5-00 ‘Joint Operations Planning’, Chapter 2.

more important this argument. Consider his perception: what does he see, what does he think he sees? Can I influence and shape it?

e. Although the object of the mission will often be the adversary, it could easily be something more indistinct. It might be the dispute between warring factions, or the ability to project sufficient combat power, or it may be the ability to sustain the necessary force in inaccessible terrain. Always look forward and envisage the ultimate strategic goal; there tends to be a preoccupation with the initial combat aspects of a conflict and this can lead to neglect of the long-term resolution of the underlying causes.

Understanding the ‘Means’

515. **Force Capabilities.** The ‘Means’ are the forces and resources allocated to the operation. The JTFC must have a clear understanding of the combat power available to him. But this is more than simply numbers and has both qualitative and quantitative aspects; he must develop a ‘feel’ for his force.

- a. What sort of tempo are they capable of? What sort of tempo do they *need* to be capable of?
- b. How are they organised? How agile are they? Are they capable of being reorganised quickly? How joint are they?
- c. How interoperable are they? Where are the ‘rubbing edges’ and what can I do about them?
- d. How do I get everybody into the ‘fight’? How do I match tasks with groupings and avoid creating individual component battles? (Think of capability in the round, not as Service or component owned.)
- e. What are the key strengths and weakness of the principal fighting systems?
- f. What is the likely impact of losses (both personnel and equipment)?
- g. Are they capable of working with civil agencies? At what level? Is some reorganisation required?
- h. Is the Force sustainable during each phase of the operation? Is the sustainability requirement supportable through movement using the Coupling Bridge?
- i. What is their fighting spirit like? What underpins this and how strong is it?

- j. What are the optimum command and control arrangements? How do I align authority with responsibility (difficult in multinational operations)?
- k. What are the key points of their doctrine? (Do they have an equivalent to the BDD⁵ Essential Elements?)

516. **Operational Reach.** What the JTFC is seeking to achieve is an understanding of the Operational Reach of his force. Operational Reach reflects the ability to project and sustain fighting power over a given geographical area for a specific period of time, and is relative to the mission and the operating environment. It is not merely about the capacity of an armoured vehicle's fuel tank or the range from a Forward Operating Base to a target. It is determined by both tangible and intangible factors and applies equally to friendly and enemy forces. It is closely linked to the idea of campaign fulcrum and decisive act (described in Chapter 3), in that an understanding of Operational Reach will help to identify where and when campaign fulcrum may take place. It seeks to establish a realistic understanding of the capacity of a force and a better feel for risk, but should not promote an overly cautious approach.⁶

517. **Command and Control.**

- a. **Command States.** In a multinational JTF there will be a great deal of discussion regarding command states. It is critical that the JTFC clearly understands what authority he has over the employment of force elements without further consultation with national authorities, and the conditions under which this framework may change.
- b. **Headquarters.** The constitution of a headquarters will be easier in a purely national force but requires more effort in a multinational context where ad hoc headquarters have been formed. Particularly where headquarters are concerned, political need may call for a level of multinationality that overrides militarily expediency, although the risks of throwing together staffs in the early stages of an operation, without time for training, cannot be overstated. In all cases, the JTFC needs to create 3 things: a common objective and or intent for each endeavour, a sense of equity of risk or reward, and goodwill.

Consideration of Potential Courses of Action

518. Often the solution to a problem will be apparent at an early stage to an experienced command team and by this stage the JTFC will have certainly identified in his own mind a number of potential outline courses of action. There will have been

⁵ JWP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine*' (BDD) (2nd Edition).

⁶ By way of a short example from North Africa during WW2: Rommel was a brilliant tactician but he neglected his logistics, fell out with his allies, and regularly overextended himself. He lost to a tactically less competent army but one where logistics were given the right sort of priority, fire support arrangements were properly coordinated and limited but achievable goals were set.

a wide range of issues which will have influenced his thinking. Some of the more difficult to balance are:

a. **Initial Dispositions.** There will almost certainly be a political need to '*get there quickly and do something*'. In trying to satisfy this imperative there is a danger that later options are collapsed or severely constrained, or the force becomes definitively committed. The character of a campaign will change, sometimes suddenly, and the force structure to deal with the opening phase, may not be right for subsequent operations. At the operational level the initial disposition of a force is a major consideration. This is particularly true for a large land force, which will often be difficult to redeploy within a JOA, and logistic basing, which is a potential limitation to the movement of forces. Air and maritime elements can provide alternatives and keep options open. Consideration of this issue should not promote an overly cautious approach. In the right circumstances a bold decision can achieve an early effect which can be exploited later.

b. **Offence and Defence.** All defensive operations should be of a defensive-offensive nature; a defence that is merely static is bound to be defeated in due course. Any defensive posture consists of 2 main parts. A system of defence which aims at netting, weakening, slowing up and eventually immobilising an opponent, and a large-scale counter attack designed to defeat or destroy. In planning for defensive operations, the JTFC should decide which areas are essential to him and which are vital to the success of the opponent's offensive. He should then dispose his force to destroy the adversary when he launches attacks against these areas. But it is only the offence that can be decisive and the defensive phase of an operation should be viewed as transitory. Offensive operations should be designed to seize and retain the initiative, and apply unrelenting pressure on an adversary. Any offensive plan should set balanced and realistic objectives, be flexible enough to exploit success, robust enough to withstand setbacks, and will rarely be successful without the achievement of at least local air superiority. Adequate time for the training and rehearsals of force elements (which will all have different requirements, e.g. air tends to need less time) before major offensive operations is critical, especially in a multinational campaign.

c. **Compromise and Risk.** Good planning is an exercise in compromise. Resource allocation is the JTFC's decision and is where the biggest compromises are to be found. The JTFC should recognise what has been compromised and move it away from discovery. Closely linked to the idea of compromise is risk. You take a risk when you need to in pursuit of operational aims, or when you can stand the consequences. In this sense one can often recover from a risk but not from a gamble, but the pay-off from a gamble is

likely to be much greater. Risk is about threats to the plan and the actual and perceived vulnerabilities to that threat. The JTFC's view of, and reaction to, these threats will be based on his experience and judgement, as well as detailed input from the staff. Ultimately, it is the JTFC who will make the final decision on the levels of risk associated with his plan, although these cannot be considered in isolation. Any military action will have potential political, economic, environmental and humanitarian consequences; what may be a low risk option for the military may be high risk elsewhere.

d. **Concentration of Force and Economy of Effort.** These 2 Principles of War are of particular relevance to the operational level. Throughout the planning and conduct of the campaign, the JTFC will be constantly reflecting on where he can concentrate his force (not the same as massing) to achieve the desired effect. The accurate identification of where he can be economical will be vital in order to permit concentration at the point of greatest impact.

e. **Simultaneity.** Simultaneity offers the prospect of overwhelming an enemy with so many threats that not only is he unable to deal with any one threat, he is unable even to prioritise effectively. This should be balanced against historical examples of commanders who, in trying to be strong *everywhere*, failed to be strong *anywhere*. This suggests that simultaneity should be viewed as something which may create the conditions for decisive action but that, if persisted in too long, risks weakening the attacking force, perhaps fatally.

f. **Logistics and Administration.** You can 'fight the battle' only that you can supply and sustain. Striking a balance between the provision of support to components and national contingents, the location and size of mobile and static stocks, at the same time as preventing over-insurance, is critical. This hinges on giving logistics staff enough knowledge at the right time to allow anticipation, which will in turn generate confidence and prevent over-insurance and an unnecessarily large logistic tail. Reducing drag while ensuring support is in the right place at the right time will impact on the ability of a force to seize and exploit opportunities. This requires both static and mobile logistics to be focused on the combat organisation, and quickly reorganised if necessary. Logistics capacity is a common thread through all the above issues and is a key determinant in the selection of a winning concept at the operational level. As such the administration and sustainment of the JTF requires leadership and direction of as high an order as any engagement, and should not be left solely to subordinate logistic and administrative staff.

SECTION III – THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A WINNING CONCEPT

519. The Operational Level Framework – SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT, EXPLOIT – assists in focusing and visualising a campaign as it progresses. Within this framework there are a number of areas that the JTFC should personally attend to.

The Joint Task Force Commander's Information Architecture

“All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don't know by what you do; that's what I called 'guessing what was on the other side of the hill'.”

Wellington

520. Information is crucial to the JTFC but he should consider information in the round not just in a narrow 'J2' sense. He should be clear about what he needs to know and when he needs the information. But he should also consider who else around him needs information and ensure he is giving it to them in the right timeframe, matching information flows with decision-making levels. At the same time as considering his own information requirements, he should also consider what he wants the adversary to know or not to know.

521. However, Wellington was not simply referring to gathering information. He was intimating that there will be occasions when, in order to '*find out what you don't know*', one has to *do* something. By testing and probing the adversary's system, the reaction will often provide insights into a wide range of issues: "*when in doubt start a fight*".⁷ In this sense it could be said that all operations are, in effect, intelligence operations.

Command Approach

522. Moral and physical courage are important qualities in a commander, whatever the level, although at the operational level moral courage is particularly important. A command style is heavily dependent on personality, but in deciding on his approach to command the JTFC may consider the following issues:

- a. At what level are decisions to be made? Avoid the danger of commanding too little and interfering too much. Consider the command responsibilities and authority in relation to the type of opponent (traditional, guerrilla, terrorist etc).

⁷ General Sir Rupert Smith.

- b. How to maintain morale? Largely through a combination of 4 characteristics: effective leadership, strong discipline (self and group), a feeling of comradeship and self-respect.
- c. How to build relations with subordinates? The importance of generating trust, shared confidence and knowledge from similar experiences, noting the value of credibility.
- d. How to bond the headquarters? The Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) staff is the commander's brain and are there to control and coordinate. Mission Command is as applicable to subordinate staffs as it is to subordinate commanders.
- e. How to disseminate Commander's Intent widely? The JTFC must personally write Para 2 - Mission and Para 3a - Concept of Operations (Commander's Intent, Scheme of Manoeuvre and Main Effort), and be closely involved in Para 5 (Command and Signal) in which he must articulate how he is going to command the operation.⁸ These elements, but especially Commander's Intent where the JTFC expresses the overall effect he wishes to achieve against the adversary, are critical in enabling subordinates to act purposefully when faced with unforeseen opportunities, or in the absence of orders.

Joint Enablers and Operations Support Activities

523. The wide range of activities within a JTFHQ is divided into 2 broad groupings: Joint Enablers and Operations Support Activities.⁹ The key distinction between these 2 groups is that the principal purpose of Joint Enablers is to enable other activity to take place, while Operations Support Activities have an end unto themselves and may form specific lines of operation. Their relative importance, or the weight of effort they require, is not fixed and will vary with time, the operating environment and the nature of the mission.

Joint Enablers		Operations Support Activities	
OPINTEL	Logistics	Info Ops	
ISR	Pol/Legal	Media Ops	
Targeting	Info Management and CIS	CIMIC	
EW	IMS	Force Protection	
Combat Identification	Finance and Accounting		

Table 5.3 - Joint Enablers and Operations Support Activities

⁸ See JWP 5-00, Chapter 2 for more detail.

⁹ See JWP 3-00 'Joint Operations Execution', Chapter 2 for more detail.

524. **Media Operations.** The media has become so important in maintaining public and political support that a commander cannot disconnect himself from it, neither can he allow it to be the sole focus of his efforts. He should be honest about his ability to deal with the media and carefully balance the use of a media spokesperson with his own appearances; there will be moments where the importance of the message to be conveyed will require his personal lead. Occasionally the issue may be of such a critical nature that he may have to compromise Operations Security (OPSEC). In every instance he must ask himself: who am I engaging and for what reason?

Integration, Co-ordination and Synchronisation of Operations

525. Clausewitz noted that “*War has a grammar of its own but no logic*”. Understanding this ‘grammar’ is not the same as imposing a false sense of order on a complex and constantly evolving situation. Rather, the JTFC should seek to turn this chaos to his advantage by having a clear understanding of the impact of tactical activity on the campaign plan, and ultimately the political objectives. Such an understanding will establish an advantage over an adversary who is unable or unwilling to recognise this essential linkage. As such he should be closely involved in the measurement of campaign effectiveness in order to assess progress – to know if he is ‘winning’. Campaign management is done largely through a series of boards and meetings organised under the banner of Campaign Rhythm.¹⁰ Exactly how this is done will vary with the nature of the operation, especially in multinational operations, but whatever the circumstances, the JTFC should be clear about what information he needs and how it should be presented to him. His role is to steer and guide the process, directly or through the COS, so that he can make timely and effective decisions.

526. The JTFC will need to make a careful assessment of other agencies operating within the JOA.

- a. This may include diplomatic and military representatives and forces from political authorities other than his own, as well as a potentially large number of international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Many of these organisations are under no obligation to co-ordinate their activities with those of the military and may be operating to a different set of objectives and values. Co-ordination, in order to achieve unity of effort, will be a difficult challenge, but it must not be viewed as a civil/military *transition*, rather as a *partnership* from the very outset.
- b. The use of Special Forces/Inter Agency (SF/IA) assets has an increasing importance in delivering decisive effect. Operations involving SF/IA are by their nature complex and potentially high risk but can offer disproportionate

¹⁰ Campaign Rhythm is described in detail in JWP 3-00, Chapter 3.

gains if appropriately employed. They require careful coordination and are reliant on OPSEC. Although the JTFC may not directly command these assets, the effect of their operations will be felt within the JOA and must be factored into deliberations.

Preparing for Opportunities and Reverses

527. To dominate his opponent the JTFC must monitor the progress of the campaign and adapt the plan to exploit opportunities to advantage – to be ready for success. There must be a flank to exploit or an ability to make one (flank in its widest sense, not just physical). Then there must be an arm capable of exploiting this flank to the point of decision; that arm must be sustained. At the same time he should attempt to anticipate reverses and plan to overcome setbacks. To do this effectively he should retain time to think, to step back, take the longer-term view and not be distracted by short-term expediency. There is a danger that the immediacy of his own actions can distract his attention from the activities and intentions of the adversary.

528. Success can breed complacency, particularly when dealing with an ‘outclassed’ adversary, and can lead to disastrous consequences. Care should be taken to prevent stagnation, to avoid becoming predictable. Although restraint should be displayed, beware of the failure to apply advantage or produce an incomplete victory.

529. In considering the establishment and committal of the Operational Level Reserve, the following questions should be addressed:

- a. Do you really need a reserve? Can you afford it?
- b. What effect do you want to achieve by its use? What size does it need to be and what capabilities does it require? Don’t think of it necessarily in a conventional sense.
- c. Where does it need to be placed (consider each element separately)? In which environment is it most likely to be used?
- d. Under what conditions will it require moving so as to be ready for employment (e.g. a significant change in the weather)?
- e. How long does it take to launch (in total or in part)? At which level should it be kept?
- f. How to conceal its location and movement from the enemy?

SECTION IV – CAMPAIGN TERMINATION¹¹

530. This is a difficult and complex issue for which there is no clear set of rules or accepted practice. It is a critical area that requires early consideration by the JTFC, and a great deal of discussion and consultation with superiors. The term campaign termination is not meant to convey an idea of traditional ‘victory’ with the formal signing of a cease-fire, followed by a celebratory victory parade. Instead it seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end-state has been achieved: how to preserve that which has been gained, how to make it enduring. As the military end-state will very likely be achieved well before the strategic end-state is realised, a follow on force will inevitably be required. Therefore, within Campaign Termination will be the need to transition from one campaign to another.

531. Some key considerations for the JTFC are:

- a. A clear idea of the conditions that should exist before the end-state can be said to have been achieved is required. These conditions should be identified beforehand and a system of measuring them put in place, recognising that they are not immutable and may alter as the campaign progresses. Often there will be a considerable time gap between the achievement of the military end-state and the strategic end-state.
- b. What structures, capabilities and postures are required next? Over the period of an operation a force will change, adjusting balance, configuration and posture, dictated by the evolving operating environment and conditions that exist at the time. It may look substantially different at the end of an operation to its original state. The difficulty of a large-scale change in posture and its adoption by a force configured mentally and physically for a different sort of operation, must not be underestimated.
- c. How to change the organisation and focus of the staff? Too early and there is a danger that they take their ‘eye off the ball’ and lose focus, too late and a period of instability may occur as readjustment takes place.
- d. How to avoid a resumption of hostilities? What state should the indigenous forces or warring factions be left in? How will responsibilities be transferred to indigenous or follow-on forces, or other agencies? Here, as much involvement by a wide range of key ‘stakeholders’ as possible is highly recommended.

¹¹ See also JWP 3-00, Chapter 3.

ANNEX 5A – THE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE

STEP 1 - REVIEW OF SITUATION (GEO-STRATEGIC ANALYSIS)

Background		Current Situation	
Factor	Consideration/Deduction	Factor	Consideration/Deduction
	(Underlying causes of the conflict, historical, ethnic or religious factors and geostrategic influences.)		(Strategic end-states, objectives and CoGs of all sides.)



The purpose of Step 1 is to ensure that the whole staff have a common understanding of the background and the underlying causes of the problem, and have a firm grip of both sides' political objectives.

STEP 2 - IDENTIFY AND ANALYSE THE PROBLEM (THE MISSION AND THE OBJECT)

MISSION: (Verbatim mission statement from Jt Comd or list of initial tasks from Planning Guidance.)		
Question/Factor	Consideration	Task/Constraint
Step 2a - Mission Analysis Ques 1 - What is the Intention of my Superior Comd(s) and what is my role in his plan? Ques 2 - What are my Specified and Implied Tasks? Ques 3 - What freedoms do I have and what constraints am I subject to? Ques 4 - Has the situation changed and if so how does it affect the plan?	(Step 2a is done by the Comd himself (perhaps with Component Commanders and key senior staff), using the standard four questions to identify and understand purpose, key tasks, constraints, freedoms (time, space, resources, ROE) and politics. Implied tasks are deduced from analysing mission specified tasks and other tasks contained elsewhere in the Directive/Orders.	

Step 2b - Initial Object Analysis	<i>(The thing(s) that provides greatest resistance to the mission or that on which the mission bears. Normally the enemy or warring factions but may also be terrain (all 3 dimensions). The Comd may provide some guidance here but the work is done by the staff. Tools which may be used are CoG analysis and JIPB. The aim is to understand the constraints and freedoms the enemy is subject to and to produce an initial view of his likely CoAs (most dangerous and most likely). As well as potential setbacks, consideration should be given as to how the JTF could exploit any success.)</i>	<i>(It may be possible to identify DPs, LoO, ME, supporting/ supported relationships, initial sequencing and phases. An attempt should be made to define operational level CoGs by identifying the thing which resists the achievement of own end-state the most (en CoG) and that which if lost would prevent you winning (own CoG). An initial view of the Concentration of Force/ Economy of Effort balance may emerge as well as areas of risk.)</i>
Enemy (most dangerous and most likely CoA)		
Yourself		
The Dispute		
The Terrain		

CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS	
1 - CoG	2 - CRITICAL CAPABILITIES
A strength.	That which makes it a CoG.
3 - CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS	4 - CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES
That which it needs to be effective as a CoG.	Through which a CoG can be attacked or neutralised.
Exploit en CVs. Fulfil own CRs, Protect own CVs	

(One of the most important tasks for the Comd is to identify what is going to be decisive and what shaping ops will be required to create the conditions for decisive success. A decisive op is aimed at disrupting the en's system and will cause his defeat. Identifying the decisive op comes from CoG analysis. A CoG will invariably be a strength, but it will have critical vulnerabilities, and its neutralisation will lead to the achievement of the end-state.)

The purpose of Step 2 is to gain a clear understanding of the problem that has been set.

STEP 3 - FORMULATION OF POTENTIAL CoAs BY THE COMD

There are 3 outputs to Step 3:	
CCIRs:	(Information which is critical for success, and which the JTFC may not have access to.)
Clarification:	(Issues on which the Superior Comd needs to provide more guidance or clarification.)
Comd's Planning Direction:	(This the key output and drives the rest of the Estimate. The Comd may be able to identify one or a number of potential CoAs, depending on whether a clear CoG has been identified. If there are a number of CoG contenders there will be a potential CoA to deal with each. An initial Campaign Plan Schematic or Intent Schematic may help in articulating the relationship between DPs, CoGs and end-states and how these might be achieved in time and space. The Comd may use SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT, EXPLOIT to frame his guidance to the staff and other CCs and to act as comparators for the evaluation of each CoA. Or he may use specific questions: Where might the campaign fulcrum be? How can I hit him where it hurts most? How can I improve my tempo? What are the risks (are they risks or gambles)? How can and where can I be decisive? How can I hit him where it hurts most? How can I best surprise him? How can I regain the initiative? How OA be used to examine force ratios (both quantitative and qualitative)? How to best integrate and co-ordinate with civil actors? What are the conditions for campaign termination and transition?)

The purpose of Step 3 is to focus staff effort on informed factor analysis in order to establish the art of the possible.

STEP 4 - DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF CoAs

CoA 1	CoA 2	Common to all
Comd conducts reces, consultations with CCs and other key comds, coalition building, further review of CoAs etc.	(This Step is where the staff apply relevant factors to produce workable and realistic CoAs based on the Comd's guidance in Step 3 and further input from him emerging from his reces and consultations etc. It is an interactive not a stove-piped process within the JTFHQ. This Step may require review of analysis done in previous Steps, as well as the introduction of new factors and the application of new information. Work should focus on the desired effect the Comd wishes to achieve on the enemy and in producing a winning concept that can be translated into a workable plan. Each CoA should have: Concept of Ops (Intent, SoM, ME, end-state), phases if necessary, force levels required, Log and deployment concept, time and space issues, and recommendations for op level reserve. Campaign Planning Schematics or Synchronisation Matrixes are useful tools to portray the detail of each CoA.)	

The purpose of Step 4 is to create detailed and workable CoAs that they can be tested for likelihood of success.

STEP 5 - CoA EVALUATION

CoA 1
Mission Comd's Intent Scheme of Manoeuvre Main Effort End-state DPs, JOs and LoOs Component Missions and Tasks Confirm/adjust CoGs

(Each CoA is compared/wargamed against CoA comparators (Principles of War, SAPE or the Comd's own set of questions) to judge the impact on CoGs/end-states and adversary CoAs (at least most likely and most dangerous) to identify adjustments, quantify risk and establish contingency plans.)

CoA 2
Mission Comd's Intent Scheme of Manoeuvre Main Effort End-state DPs, JOs and LoOs Component Missions and Tasks Confirm/adjust CoGs

The purpose of Step 5 is to present sufficient detail to the Comd to allow him to select a winning concept.

STEP 6 - COMD's DECISION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

Comd's Selection and Final Guidance:
(Once the Comd has selected the option which he believes is most likely to be successful (and at least cost), he will then give his direction to the staff for the development of the necessary product (Campaign Plan, OPLAN, DSO, Synchronisation Matrix etc), as well as any Contingency Plans which are to be worked up. He should write the Concept of Ops (but at the least the Comd's Intent) and the Component Mission Statements himself. Wargaming can continue to further refine details of the Task Org, and following orders with subordinate comds and key staff.)

The purpose of Step 6 is to turn the winning concept into a workable plan.